Rewrite as a Rust, Apache-2.0 workspace

Supersedes the Go + embed-Mox design. The Go tree is removed; its
architecture doc is preserved at docs/archive/ARCHITECTURE-go-embed-mox.md
because its competitive analysis and data model still hold.

Five decisions recorded as ADRs:

  0001  Rust, not Go — accepting ~5,500 lines of protocol code that Mox
        would have given us free, to get the first permissively licensed
        Rust mail server. Costs stated plainly.
  0002  Apache-2.0, not MIT or AGPL — patent grant, trademark, CLA-free
        contribution. Public on GitHub; Gitea stays as the private fallback.
  0003  Stalwart's primitive crates (Apache-2.0/MIT) yes; its AGPL server
        crates never. DANE and MTA-STS sit on the AGPL side of that line,
        which is why we write our own.
  0004  Milestones, reordered: embedded inbound is required at launch.
  0005  Oracle Cloud blocks outbound :25, so direct-to-MX is impossible on
        the launch host. Split delivery is mandatory, not an on-ramp.

Twelve crates in three tiers. Tier 1 (mail-dane, mail-mta-sts, mail-dsn)
is standalone and publishable — no `dane` or `mta-sts` crate exists on
crates.io at all today.

openmail-relay ships the provider table as data, with SES and Oracle from
the start. Oracle's and Resend's SPF includes are deliberately None: a
guessed include turns the DNS check green against a mechanism the provider
does not honour, and mail still fails SPF silently.

cargo check/test/clippy/fmt all green; unsafe_code is forbidden workspace
wide; cargo-deny enforces the licence policy in CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JkyvfNJGTshJNE9FtwPLk7

crates/mail-mta-sts/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+//! MTA-STS — RFC 8461.
+//!
+//! There is **no MTA-STS crate on crates.io** at the time of writing. Stalwart
+//! implements it in AGPL server crates. This is the permissive implementation.
+//!
+//! MTA-STS is DANE's non-DNSSEC cousin: a domain publishes a TXT record naming
+//! a policy `id`, and serves the policy itself over HTTPS at
+//! `https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt`. The HTTPS certificate is
+//! what makes the policy trustworthy — so **the fetch must use full `WebPKI`
+//! validation with no exceptions**, and a policy fetched over a connection
+//! whose certificate failed validation must be discarded, not cached.
+//!
+//! # Caching is the correctness problem
+//!
+//! The `max_age` in a policy can be a year. A cached `enforce` policy that is
+//! wrong will silently defer a domain's mail for as long as it is cached, and
+//! nothing in the sending path will look broken. So:
+//!
+//! - a policy is cached only after a fully validated HTTPS fetch;
+//! - the TXT `id` changing invalidates the cache immediately;
+//! - a fetch failure **never** evicts a valid cached policy (RFC 8461 §5.1) —
+//!   an attacker who can block HTTPS must not be able to strip the policy.
+
+#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/mail-mta-sts/0.1.0")]
+
+/// What the domain asks senders to do.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Mode {
+    /// Deliver only over a validated TLS connection to a listed MX. On failure,
+    /// **defer** — never fall back to cleartext.
+    Enforce,
+    /// Behave as `Enforce` but deliver anyway on failure, reporting via TLS-RPT.
+    Testing,
+    /// Policy withdrawn. Cached policies for this domain must be dropped.
+    None,
+}
+
+/// A parsed policy.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Policy {
+    pub mode: Mode,
+    /// MX patterns, which may contain a single leading `*.` wildcard.
+    pub mx: Vec<String>,
+    /// Seconds this policy may be cached. RFC 8461 caps meaningful values at
+    /// `31_557_600` (one year).
+    pub max_age: u32,
+    /// The `id` from the DNS TXT record this policy was fetched for.
+    pub id: String,
+}
+
+impl Policy {
+    /// Does `host` satisfy this policy's MX patterns?
+    ///
+    /// Wildcards match exactly one label (`*.example.com` matches
+    /// `mx.example.com` but not `a.mx.example.com`), per RFC 8461 §4.1.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn allows_mx(&self, _host: &str) -> bool {
+        todo!("v0.2")
+    }
+}
+
+/// The outcome of applying MTA-STS to one delivery attempt. As in
+/// [`mail_dane`](https://docs.rs/mail-dane), every case is explicit — there is
+/// no boolean that could be read as "fine".
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum StsResult {
+    /// An `enforce` policy is in effect and this MX + TLS chain satisfies it.
+    Enforced,
+    /// A `testing` policy failed. Deliver, but emit a TLS-RPT failure.
+    TestingFailure,
+    /// An `enforce` policy is in effect and was **not** satisfied. Defer.
+    Violation,
+    /// No policy published. Fall back to opportunistic TLS.
+    NotApplicable,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("DNS lookup failed: {0}")]
+    Dns(String),
+    #[error("policy fetch failed: {0}")]
+    Fetch(String),
+    #[error("malformed policy: {0}")]
+    Malformed(String),
+}
+
+/// Parse the body of an `mta-sts.txt` policy file.
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// Returns [`Error::Malformed`] on a missing `version`, unknown `mode`, absent
+/// `mx` for an enforcing policy, or unparseable `max_age`.
+pub fn parse_policy(_body: &str, _id: &str) -> Result<Policy, Error> {
+    todo!("v0.2")
+}