cargo-deny's advisory check caught the rsa crate (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, the
Marvin Attack — private-key recovery through a timing sidechannel that is
observable over the network, with no fixed version available).
Root cause was ours: enabling mail-auth's 'generate' feature, which exists
to create DKIM keypairs and pulls in the pure-Rust rsa implementation. The
default aws-lc-rs backend signs and verifies in constant time, which is what
a service listening on :25 actually needs. Key generation is a one-time
operator action and belongs in tooling (openssl genpkey), not in the daemon.
Fixed by removing the feature rather than by adding an advisory exception —
the reason is recorded inline in Cargo.toml so nobody re-adds it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JkyvfNJGTshJNE9FtwPLk7
Store: the full Postgres schema as an embedded migration. UUIDv7 keys so
`ORDER BY id` is a free chronological index; raw MIME and attachments live
in object storage with only a key in the row; `pods` present from day one
because retrofitting tenancy costs more than an unused column. API keys are
stored as a SHA-256 hash — a database dump must not be a set of live
credentials.
API: the v0 route table, including `ingest`, which closes the
receive→thread→extract loop with zero mail infrastructure and is what makes
the agent layer testable in CI. Scopes are a closed enum rather than
strings, so "can send mail" and "can mint keys" are not one typo apart.
Internal errors are logged in full and reported as a bare string.
MCP: the tool catalogue, six tools. Adding a row here is the only way an
agent gains a capability — a new REST route is invisible until someone opts
it in. Three tests guard the rule that no tool can ever reach key
management; CI fails rather than production.
ADR 0006: enterprise self-hosted first. A hosted offering comes only after
we have run this ourselves long enough to have a deliverability record
worth selling. `pods` stays in the schema as the thing that keeps that path
open — do not remove it as dead code.
Also: multi-stage Dockerfile running as a non-root system user with no
shell in the runtime image, and the openmail.karti.ai static page.
17 tests, zero clippy warnings, fmt clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JkyvfNJGTshJNE9FtwPLk7
Supersedes the Go + embed-Mox design. The Go tree is removed; its
architecture doc is preserved at docs/archive/ARCHITECTURE-go-embed-mox.md
because its competitive analysis and data model still hold.
Five decisions recorded as ADRs:
0001 Rust, not Go — accepting ~5,500 lines of protocol code that Mox
would have given us free, to get the first permissively licensed
Rust mail server. Costs stated plainly.
0002 Apache-2.0, not MIT or AGPL — patent grant, trademark, CLA-free
contribution. Public on GitHub; Gitea stays as the private fallback.
0003 Stalwart's primitive crates (Apache-2.0/MIT) yes; its AGPL server
crates never. DANE and MTA-STS sit on the AGPL side of that line,
which is why we write our own.
0004 Milestones, reordered: embedded inbound is required at launch.
0005 Oracle Cloud blocks outbound :25, so direct-to-MX is impossible on
the launch host. Split delivery is mandatory, not an on-ramp.
Twelve crates in three tiers. Tier 1 (mail-dane, mail-mta-sts, mail-dsn)
is standalone and publishable — no `dane` or `mta-sts` crate exists on
crates.io at all today.
openmail-relay ships the provider table as data, with SES and Oracle from
the start. Oracle's and Resend's SPF includes are deliberately None: a
guessed include turns the DNS check green against a mechanism the provider
does not honour, and mail still fails SPF silently.
cargo check/test/clippy/fmt all green; unsafe_code is forbidden workspace
wide; cargo-deny enforces the licence policy in CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JkyvfNJGTshJNE9FtwPLk7
