Rebuild the shell, add Calendar and Learn, and govern reads
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -11,31 +11,32 @@ import {
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supplyDeals,
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type Database,
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} from '@pig/db';
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import { isPageContext } from '@pig/core';
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import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import type { PiggyChatContext } from './chat';
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import { createPagePigTools } from './page-tools';
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import { defineTool, type AgentTool } from './provider';
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import { createAccountLifecycleTool } from './lifecycle-tools';
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const noInput = z.object({}).strict();
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/** Interactive chat gets one record-scoped read tool and no ambient access. */
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/**
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* Interactive chat gets one scoped read tool and no ambient access.
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*
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* A record context gets `pig_get_record`, which takes no id and so cannot
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* pivot to another row. A page context gets the single tool that answers that
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* page — and never `pig_get_record`, because there is no record to read and a
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* tool that would throw is a wasted turn out of four.
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*/
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export function createInteractivePigTools(
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db: Database,
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context: PiggyChatContext | undefined,
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): AgentTool[] {
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if (!context) {
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return [
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defineTool({
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name: 'pig_get_workspace_summary',
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description:
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'Read a bounded summary of the PIG workspace: active deals, commitments, allocations ' +
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'and contracts. This cannot inspect the filesystem or external systems.',
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inputSchema: noInput,
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execute: async () => readWorkspaceSummary(db),
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}),
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];
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}
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// No context is the dashboard case by another name: the same bounded
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// workspace overview, rather than a second definition that could drift.
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if (!context) return createPagePigTools(db, '/');
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if (isPageContext(context)) return createPagePigTools(db, context.route);
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if (context.type === 'account') {
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return [
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defineTool({
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@@ -61,31 +62,9 @@ export function createInteractivePigTools(
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];
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}
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async function readWorkspaceSummary(db: Database): Promise<unknown> {
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const [demand, supply, commitments, reservations, paperwork] = await Promise.all([
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db.select().from(demandDeals).limit(100),
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db.select().from(supplyDeals).limit(100),
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db.select().from(capacityCommitments).limit(100),
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db.select().from(allocations).limit(200),
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db.select().from(contracts).limit(100),
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]);
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return {
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demandDeals: demand,
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supplyDeals: supply,
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capacityCommitments: commitments,
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allocations: reservations,
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contracts: paperwork,
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truncated: {
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demandDeals: demand.length === 100,
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supplyDeals: supply.length === 100,
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capacityCommitments: commitments.length === 100,
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allocations: reservations.length === 200,
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contracts: paperwork.length === 100,
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},
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};
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}
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type PiggyRecordContext = Exclude<PiggyChatContext, { type: 'page' }>;
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async function readFocusedRecord(db: Database, context: PiggyChatContext): Promise<unknown> {
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async function readFocusedRecord(db: Database, context: PiggyRecordContext): Promise<unknown> {
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if (context.type === 'account') {
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const [account] = await db.select().from(accounts).where(eq(accounts.id, context.id)).limit(1);
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if (!account) throw new Error('The account in focus no longer exists.');
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