Authenticate against any OIDC provider, for on-premises installs

The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment
had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network
already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to
stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated
environment usually refused outright.

Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is
discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips
discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over
Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment
file without them quietly taking over.

Three decisions worth stating:

Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per
request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of
every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes
the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next
request.

The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the
provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a
token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session.
It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue
single-audience tokens.

Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers
disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys
membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account
identity.

Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly
configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads
it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was
already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase.

18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign
signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired
token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become
permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they
run offline.

Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC
alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the
genuinely missing admin list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/e2e/critical-path.test.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ test('invite-bound member creates, sells and observes capacity through authentic
     PIGGY_ENABLED: 'false',
   });
   const authProvider = {
+    name: 'e2e-stub',
     async verifyAccessToken(token: string) {
       if (token !== accessToken) throw new Error('Invalid E2E token.');
       return { subject, email };