feat/piggy-ux
6 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 claude
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99d165b5e5 |
Rebuild Piggy's interface, and give the demo book a business to describe
Piggy answered in raw markdown, threw away every tool result it streamed, and fought the reader's scroll on every token. The three surfaces that made it worth having — what it read, how it reasoned, what it cost — were all on the wire and none of them reached the screen. The transcript is now composed of five parts under components/piggy: answers render through streamdown, the container sticks to the bottom without pinning the reader there, tool steps say what they read and link to the record, and each turn carries its model and token count. Three lifecycle bugs went with them: Stop left a permanent spinner, a truncated stream was indistinguishable from thinking, and a failed send destroyed the message it failed to send. Underneath, the inference path grew timeouts, jittered retries on 429 and 5xx, tolerance of the malformed frames a 30B model emits, and an agent_runs row per turn so chat spend is observable. The system prompt now states that a field ending in Cents is cents — without it nemotron renders costPerGpuHourCents: 189 as "$189 per GPU-hour", which is a 100x error on the most scrutinised number in the room. The demo book was arithmetically incoherent: every deal's value contradicted its own allocation revenue by up to 3.6x, nothing had ever closed, no customer had any paper, and the marketplace was empty. Deal value is now derived from the allocation, the book clears 5.3% across five blocks with one deliberately underwater, and the renewal, compliance and agent-provenance machinery finally has rows to act on. A --clear that deleted every obligation, SLA term and capacity request in the database regardless of origin is scoped to the demo's own ids. Around that: accounts have a detail page, ⌘K searches the book, Settings can mint the API keys it always claimed to, and deploy.sh actually ships the agent instead of silently skipping its compose profile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 karti
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45b70b17f0 |
Redesign Learn, and give it five real videos in Karti's voice
THE PAGE. The anonymous route rendered outside Shell, so it sat flush against
the viewport edge and read as a form rather than a product — which is the first
thing anyone at Prime Intellect sees when the link is shared. It now brings its
own chrome and leads with a hero; the platform track is a numbered course, the
concept tracks are a poster grid, and admin add/archive moved behind one Manage
toggle so they stop competing with the content. Verified in Chrome at 1440 and
393, light and dark: horizontal overflow is 0 in all three access states.
THE VIDEOS. Five ~30s walkthroughs, narrated in Karti's cloned voice through
Chatterbox and cut against real screen capture of the seeded demo book. The
audio is rendered FIRST and its measured duration drives the capture, because a
shot list that runs short leaves the narrator talking over a frozen frame and
one that runs long gets cut mid-sentence. Levels are loudness-normalised so
clips do not jump between videos.
Cap cannot take a programmatic upload — video.karti.ai needs an interactive
login — so PIG serves these itself. A native <video> on this origin needs no
iframe and therefore no CSP frame-src at all; Karti's own Cap recordings still
render through the existing iframe path, which is why the resolver is now a
discriminated union.
THREE THINGS THE VERIFIERS CAUGHT, all of which shipped green:
- createMediaRoutes was never mounted. Every layer landed — migration, seed,
both feeds, the bind mount, the docs — except the one that serves the bytes,
so /media/learn/* fell through to the SPA fallback and answered HTTP 200
text/html. The player showed a black box with working controls and no error.
The tests certified the route factory in isolation, which proves the handler
and says nothing about whether it is wired in. There is now an assertion
against the ASSEMBLED app, and it fails loudly on content-type — the failure
mode is a 200, not a 404.
- A symlink in the media directory escaped the root. resolve() is lexical and
stat() follows links, so the containment check this file's own header
promised did not hold. realpath before the check closes it.
- Vite proxied only /api, so self-hosted playback broke for anyone running the
app the documented way — in the same invisible 200-text/html manner.
Also: a duplicate media slug used to throw from the middle of seedDemo() and
take out every later section; it now reports and skips that one entry. And the
player has an onError state, because content-addressed filenames mean a
re-render deliberately leaves the old row pointing at a file that is gone.
The three DEMO platform rows are dropped — five real recordings supersede them,
and placeholders sitting under real ones made the page read as half-finished to
the audience it is meant to convince. The supply and demand concept rows stay:
there are no real recordings for those tracks yet, and an empty track hides the
shape of the page.
Tests 275, typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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karti
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13dec6b4b8 |
Rebuild the shell, add Calendar and Learn, and govern reads
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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c821b2ca07 |
Authenticate against any OIDC provider, for on-premises installs
CI / verify (push) Successful in 2m55s
The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated environment usually refused outright. Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment file without them quietly taking over. Three decisions worth stating: Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next request. The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session. It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue single-audience tokens. Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account identity. Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase. 18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they run offline. Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the genuinely missing admin list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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853bde2265 |
Build the agent-native compute CRM platform
CI / verify (push) Successful in 3m6s
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karti
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d36762f264 |
Scaffold PIG and model the compute-GTM ontology
PIG is an agent-native CRM for two-sided AI-compute companies: businesses that buy GPU capacity from providers and resell it. Their business is the spread between two pipelines, which is precisely what a generic CRM cannot represent. The load-bearing decision is the `allocations` table, joining a capacity_commitment (what we bought, at a known cost) to a demand_deal (what we sold, at a known price). Margin, utilisation and idle capacity all fall out of that one join. Cost is charged against the full commitment rather than only the hours that sold, because unsold hours are already paid for and any other treatment flatters a block that is losing money. Domain decisions worth noting, each grounded in how this market operates: - Demand stages put `legal` second, not last. Customers do not hand workloads to an infrastructure provider before paper is executed. - Supply qualification splits technical from financial diligence, recorded attributably. Accepting capacity is a two-key decision. - Capacity carries a time SHAPE (intervals + quantities), not a window. Commitments ramp and step down; a rectangle reports availability that does not exist in the month someone wants it. - SLAs model three distinct shapes: none, a reliability tier plus credits policy, and a negotiated agreement. Aggregators generally cannot promise uptime on resold capacity, but negotiate heavyweight paper upstream. Remedies include fee abatement, which is materially better than a capped credit and is not expressible as one. - Export control is a predicate on the allocation edge, evaluated against the ULTIMATE parent's jurisdiction. Country of incorporation is not a valid key, so this cannot live as a flag on an account. - Agent-derived claims land in `facts` with a confidence band and evidence. Only verified claims self-apply; weaker ones await review. - The API never calls the agent. It writes to a leased queue, guarded by a partial unique index on unfinished work. Verified: typechecks clean, migration generates and applies to Postgres 16 (31 tables, 24 enums, 117 indexes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |