feat/piggy-ux
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 karti
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76e3caa1cb |
Drop the Comp AI CRM acknowledgement
Nothing in PIG derives from that repository. The fact model, the leased agent task queue and the `agentBrief` field are our own designs, and MIT's attribution condition reaches copied source, not ideas — so the credit was a courtesy that misstated where this code came from. The one line worth keeping was never a credit: AGENTS.md's rule against lifting component files out of somebody else's repo. It is restated generically, and the shadcn-from-upstream guidance stays. Buzz keeps its NOTICE entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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13dec6b4b8 |
Rebuild the shell, add Calendar and Learn, and govern reads
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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a6167629cc |
Move from npm to pnpm across the workspace, CI and the image
CI / verify (push) Successful in 3m23s
The monorepo was on npm workspaces. pnpm gives it a content-addressed store shared between the eight packages, a lockfile that records the whole graph rather than a flattened view of it, and — the reason this mattered in practice — `workspace:*`, which makes an internal dependency unambiguous instead of a version range that npm may satisfy from the registry. Mechanics: - `packageManager: pnpm@11.21.0` pins the version; corepack installs it in CI and in the image, so all three environments resolve identically. - The npm `workspaces` array is replaced by `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. pnpm ignores the former, and keeping both would leave two sources of truth. - All six internal dependencies moved to `workspace:*`. - Root scripts use `pnpm -r --if-present` and `pnpm -F <pkg>`. Two findings worth recording, both from running it rather than reading it: `tsx` was a devDependency, but the server runs TypeScript directly in production — the container's command is `pnpm exec tsx apps/api/src/server.ts`. Under npm this was concealed by the runtime stage re-installing tsx by hand after pruning dev dependencies. Under `pnpm install --prod` that sleight of hand stops working and the image simply fails to start. tsx is now declared in `dependencies`, which is what it has always actually been. The first image build failed with ERR_PNPM_ABORTED_REMOVE_MODULES_DIR_NO_TTY. That is not a pnpm bug: it had decided the modules directory was stale and wanted confirmation before deleting it, which a non-interactive build cannot give. The trigger was the host's `node_modules` reaching the build context — there was no `.dockerignore` at all. pnpm's tree is symlinks into a content-addressed store, so copying it into an image produces dangling links and a directory pnpm rightly considers corrupt. Fixed by adding `.dockerignore` and setting `CI=true`, which is required in any non-interactive pnpm build. `esbuild` is denied install scripts via `allowBuilds`. Its platform binary arrives through the optional dependency `@esbuild/linux-x64` and the postinstall only verifies it; confirmed by running the binary directly, which reports 0.25.12. Verified under pnpm: typecheck clean, 150 tests / 0 failures, e2e passes, web builds. The image was built and booted against a real Postgres — health ok, `/api/dashboard` 401 with an issuer configured, `/` and `/capacity` serve the SPA, `/og.png` serves as image/png, and the migrator runs from the pruned runtime stage. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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c2c7fb9c19 |
Make mutations confirm themselves, and seed the evidence trail
CI / verify (push) Successful in 2m51s
Two demo gaps, both of which made working features look like they were not there. **Toasts fired into nothing.** RecordSheets already called toast.success on every save, but <Toaster /> was never mounted, so nothing appeared. It could not be mounted, either: the shadcn original imports next-themes, which PIG does not use — it has its own provider so a chosen theme is persisted server-side and follows a user between devices. Rewired to PIG's useTheme, mounted inside ThemeProvider, and offset clear of the phone tab bar and the home indicator. Feedback added where the interface otherwise gives none: allocation and hold report the GPU-hours actually written, because the sheet closes on success and the only other evidence is a number moving off-screen; releasing a hold says the capacity is sellable again; fact decisions say what the decision meant, and that approving evidence is not the same as writing it to a record; the profile form confirms rather than just clearing itself, which otherwise reads as the input being discarded. **The fact table was empty**, so the review queue and every provenance tooltip had nothing to show — the mechanism that makes an agent-written CRM trustworthy, invisible. Six agent-derived facts seeded with a deliberate mix: two applied, showing what a confident agent writes unprompted, and four proposed, including one weak claim that a reviewer should reject, so the queue is not a row of obvious approvals. Each carries a score, a band, evidence and where available a source. Idempotent on subject+field+value; verified over two runs. Verified: toast confirmed firing in a real browser on a 393px viewport, 135 unit tests and e2e green, typecheck clean, CSP hash unchanged, 0px horizontal overflow across 12 routes at both breakpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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2763531ce4 |
Align shadcn's accent token with what shadcn means by it
CI / verify (push) Successful in 2m53s
shadcn uses `bg-accent` for its SUBTLE surfaces — dropdown item hover, command row selection, ghost and outline button hover, the dialog close affordance. The brand colour in shadcn is `primary`. PIG's Tailwind config mapped `accent` to `--accent`, which is the brand. That inverted the meaning, so every shadcn hover and selection state painted a full-strength brand block. With the monochrome "pig" palette in dark mode the brand is near-white, so a selected command row rendered as a white slab against a near-black sheet. Measured before the change: selected row rgb(250,250,250) on a rgb(9,9,11) body. `accent` now aliases `--accent-subtle` and `accent-foreground` aliases `--accent-fg`, which is what those tokens were created for. The eleven places where PIG's own components wanted a solid brand fill — filled chips, selected card borders, progress bars — move to `primary`, which still resolves to `--accent`. A `brand` alias is added for clarity. After: selected row rgb(39,39,42) in dark and rgb(244,244,245) in light, both a subtle tint above the body; the pipeline's active stage chip stays a solid rgb(250,250,250) fill, unchanged. Found by opening overlays, which earlier screenshot sweeps never did — every route had been checked, but a dropdown or a command palette only misbehaves once it is open. Worth remembering: page-level sweeps do not exercise portals. Typecheck clean, 135 unit tests and e2e green, CSP hash unchanged, 0px horizontal overflow across 12 routes at 393px and 1440px. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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c821b2ca07 |
Authenticate against any OIDC provider, for on-premises installs
CI / verify (push) Successful in 2m55s
The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated environment usually refused outright. Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment file without them quietly taking over. Three decisions worth stating: Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next request. The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session. It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue single-audience tokens. Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account identity. Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase. 18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they run offline. Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the genuinely missing admin list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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54edee30ed |
Unknown /api paths returned the SPA with HTTP 200
An authenticated GET to any unrecognised API route — a typo, a renamed endpoint, an older client — fell through to the SPA fallback and returned 200 text/html containing the app shell. This is close to the worst failure shape for an API consumer. `response.ok` is true, so nothing treats it as an error; the caller then dies on `JSON.parse` with "Unexpected token '<'" far from the actual cause. The MCP server, the CLI and Piggy all consume this API and would all have hit it. It was masked from casual testing because unauthenticated requests are rejected earlier by the auth middleware, so it only appears once you hold a valid token. Found by probing production with Scott's token: GET /api/keys (the real path is /api/api-keys) returned 200 text/html. The static-file middleware already carried this guard — added for the same reason when og.png was being served as HTML — but the SPA fallback beneath it did not. Same guard, one place missing. Verified: unknown API paths now return 404 application/json, real API paths still answer, client-side routes still receive the shell, and static assets still serve with their own content types. Typecheck clean, 124 unit tests and the e2e suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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6bd5526675 |
Give Card min-w-0 so the page stops scrolling sideways on a phone
The Overview page overflowed 80px at 393px wide. Traced to the "The book" card: the grid column was a correct 361px, the card inside it was 457px and refused to shrink. Confirmed by forcing `min-width: 0` on grid children in the live page, which took the overflow to 0. Fixed on the Card base class rather than at the call site, because this is the third time the same trap has been fixed individually — grid and flex children default to `min-width: auto` and cards routinely hold something unshrinkable, a tabular-nums figure or a nowrap badge. `min-width: 0` is inert for a block-level card outside a flex or grid parent, so applying it always costs nothing and removes the whole class of bug. Verified by running the stack locally against the demo data: 0px overflow across all 12 routes at both 393px and 1440px. AGENTS.md updated to say any NEW container primitive needs the same, with the one-line browser check to confirm it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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bfd2f8d95a |
Add AGENTS.md — onboarding for whoever picks this up next
CI / verify (push) Successful in 1m32s
Named by convention so a coding agent finds it without being told. Written to get someone productive from a cold start without having to reconstruct the reasoning from the diff. Four sections carry the weight. The architecture rules that must not be broken, each of which fails silently rather than loudly — intelligence never lives in the API, authentication is not authorization, cost is charged against the full commitment, sold and held are different things. The traps that have already cost time here, with the specific symptom each produces: onConflictDoNothing being a no-op without a constraint, z.coerce.boolean turning "false" into true, grid children needing min-w-0, Drizzle emitting a cast Postgres rejects, the CSP allowing exactly one inline script by hash, and the Prime Intellect API quoting node totals rather than per-GPU prices. The conventions, including that comments explain why rather than what. And an explicit start order. The last section says what not to do, which is the part most easily lost: do not copy component files from the MIT project we borrowed ideas from, do not open self-registration on a shared identity provider, do not put a production key on the CI runner, do not weaken the guard that refuses to serve the CRM unauthenticated, and do not invent email addresses for real people. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |