Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things
worth knowing before reading the diff:
RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is
stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago.
So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one
is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated
member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull
per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and
every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business,
that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read,
a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member.
THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen.
Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled
against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment
creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply.
POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability
check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect.
It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write.
The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account
switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to
the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its
bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on,
and gains the sidebar as a sheet.
Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table,
because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and
commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the
whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts,
which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be
alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere.
Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be
opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped
learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal
and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing
check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible"
is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts
a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and
/api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without.
CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a
release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can
execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both
halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the
host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a
public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`,
without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local.
Tests 141 -> 261.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
packages/prime — a hand-written typed client, because the first-party SDK is
Python only. Deliberately narrow: PIG reads availability and nothing else, and
the key it holds should be scoped so it could not provision even if the code
tried. Rate limits are undocumented upstream, so it backs off empirically with
full jitter and honours Retry-After. Unknown fields survive in `raw` rather
than being dropped.
apps/api — Hono, with authentication and authorization kept firmly apart. A
verified JWT proves someone has an account in the identity project, which may
be shared with other applications; it does NOT prove they belong here. Access
requires a row in PIG's own users table, and a token without one gets 403
needs_profile rather than entry.
The capacity service is the business logic: availability counts sold and held
separately, so a live hold removes inventory from everyone else's availability
without inflating utilisation. Expired holds are ignored at read time, so the
numbers stay right even when the sweeper is behind. Matching treats
interconnect as a hard filter and excludes Unknown as well as Ethernet —
unverified is not the same as adequate.
apps/mcp — nine tools over stdio, so a team member drives PIG from Claude
Code, Codex, prime-agent, or a Buzz agent. It holds an API key and calls the
same HTTP API the browser does, with no database credentials, so an agent can
never reach further than the person it acts for. Results are formatted as
prose rather than raw JSON.
Theme preferences live in the database rather than localStorage, so a chosen
accent follows someone from laptop to phone. Status colours stay independent
of the accent: if "at risk" re-tinted to whatever a user picked, the signal
would be gone.
Note on the SDK import: its package exports use a `./*` wildcard whose types
entry resolves server/mcp.js to server/mcp.js.d.ts, which does not exist. The
runtime specifier must keep the .js suffix, so the types are mapped via
tsconfig paths rather than by writing an import that would fail at runtime.
Verified: all five packages typecheck; the MCP server constructs and registers
its tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
karti