The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment
had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network
already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to
stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated
environment usually refused outright.
Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is
discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips
discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over
Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment
file without them quietly taking over.
Three decisions worth stating:
Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per
request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of
every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes
the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next
request.
The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the
provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a
token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session.
It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue
single-audience tokens.
Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers
disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys
membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account
identity.
Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly
configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads
it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was
already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase.
18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign
signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired
token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become
permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they
run offline.
Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC
alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the
genuinely missing admin list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PIG is an agent-native CRM for two-sided AI-compute companies: businesses
that buy GPU capacity from providers and resell it. Their business is the
spread between two pipelines, which is precisely what a generic CRM cannot
represent.
The load-bearing decision is the `allocations` table, joining a
capacity_commitment (what we bought, at a known cost) to a demand_deal
(what we sold, at a known price). Margin, utilisation and idle capacity all
fall out of that one join. Cost is charged against the full commitment
rather than only the hours that sold, because unsold hours are already paid
for and any other treatment flatters a block that is losing money.
Domain decisions worth noting, each grounded in how this market operates:
- Demand stages put `legal` second, not last. Customers do not hand
workloads to an infrastructure provider before paper is executed.
- Supply qualification splits technical from financial diligence, recorded
attributably. Accepting capacity is a two-key decision.
- Capacity carries a time SHAPE (intervals + quantities), not a window.
Commitments ramp and step down; a rectangle reports availability that
does not exist in the month someone wants it.
- SLAs model three distinct shapes: none, a reliability tier plus credits
policy, and a negotiated agreement. Aggregators generally cannot promise
uptime on resold capacity, but negotiate heavyweight paper upstream.
Remedies include fee abatement, which is materially better than a capped
credit and is not expressible as one.
- Export control is a predicate on the allocation edge, evaluated against
the ULTIMATE parent's jurisdiction. Country of incorporation is not a
valid key, so this cannot live as a flag on an account.
- Agent-derived claims land in `facts` with a confidence band and evidence.
Only verified claims self-apply; weaker ones await review.
- The API never calls the agent. It writes to a leased queue, guarded by a
partial unique index on unfinished work.
Verified: typechecks clean, migration generates and applies to Postgres 16
(31 tables, 24 enums, 117 indexes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
karti