The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment
had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network
already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to
stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated
environment usually refused outright.
Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is
discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips
discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over
Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment
file without them quietly taking over.
Three decisions worth stating:
Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per
request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of
every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes
the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next
request.
The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the
provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a
token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session.
It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue
single-audience tokens.
Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers
disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys
membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account
identity.
Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly
configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads
it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was
already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase.
18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign
signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired
token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become
permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they
run offline.
Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC
alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the
genuinely missing admin list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
z.coerce.boolean() calls Boolean(value), so the string "false" is true. So are
"0", "no" and "off". Every feature flag set to false was silently on.
Caught by reading a startup warning that should not have been there: the
deployment logged "PRIME_SYNC_ENABLED is on but PRIME_API_KEY is unset" while
the .env plainly said false. Had the key been present, PIG would have started
polling a third-party API nobody asked it to poll.
Replaced with an explicit parser accepting 1/true/yes/on, treating an empty or
absent value as the default. Demonstrated both behaviours side by side before
committing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
packages/prime — a hand-written typed client, because the first-party SDK is
Python only. Deliberately narrow: PIG reads availability and nothing else, and
the key it holds should be scoped so it could not provision even if the code
tried. Rate limits are undocumented upstream, so it backs off empirically with
full jitter and honours Retry-After. Unknown fields survive in `raw` rather
than being dropped.
apps/api — Hono, with authentication and authorization kept firmly apart. A
verified JWT proves someone has an account in the identity project, which may
be shared with other applications; it does NOT prove they belong here. Access
requires a row in PIG's own users table, and a token without one gets 403
needs_profile rather than entry.
The capacity service is the business logic: availability counts sold and held
separately, so a live hold removes inventory from everyone else's availability
without inflating utilisation. Expired holds are ignored at read time, so the
numbers stay right even when the sweeper is behind. Matching treats
interconnect as a hard filter and excludes Unknown as well as Ethernet —
unverified is not the same as adequate.
apps/mcp — nine tools over stdio, so a team member drives PIG from Claude
Code, Codex, prime-agent, or a Buzz agent. It holds an API key and calls the
same HTTP API the browser does, with no database credentials, so an agent can
never reach further than the person it acts for. Results are formatted as
prose rather than raw JSON.
Theme preferences live in the database rather than localStorage, so a chosen
accent follows someone from laptop to phone. Status colours stay independent
of the accent: if "at risk" re-tinted to whatever a user picked, the signal
would be gone.
Note on the SDK import: its package exports use a `./*` wildcard whose types
entry resolves server/mcp.js to server/mcp.js.d.ts, which does not exist. The
runtime specifier must keep the .js suffix, so the types are mapped via
tsconfig paths rather than by writing an import that would fail at runtime.
Verified: all five packages typecheck; the MCP server constructs and registers
its tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
karti