376ef3d5975f009ce95a45f26cd61be0ac46b15a
56 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 karti
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93818a2d2c |
Document two proxy traps found by deploying rather than assuming
The deployment came up healthy, served a valid certificate, and returned 200 — and was completely unreachable. Two distinct causes, both invisible from inside the host: 1. Every other site on this proxy binds to a private VNIC address. Caddy groups site blocks into servers BY listen address, so a block without `bind` landed in a separate server on :443. The specific listener wins for traffic arriving on that address, which is all public traffic after NAT, so requests hit the server that had never heard of these hostnames and fell through to an empty 200. Testing from the host with --resolve 127.0.0.1 worked perfectly, which is exactly why this was worth chasing from a third machine instead of trusting a local check. 2. The CSP blocked the inline pre-paint theme script, so dark-mode users would have seen a white flash on every load. Fixed with the script's hash rather than 'unsafe-inline', which would have defeated the policy, and rather than an external file, which would have reintroduced the flash. Editing that script changes its hash and silently breaks it, so that is written down. Verified from an independent host: health returns JSON, the app serves, an unauthenticated API call is refused, the short alias redirects, security headers are present, and the existing sites on the proxy are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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7bb8835974 |
Add profile creation — close the gap between signing in and being a member
Deploying and then trying to actually use it surfaced a dead end: /api/signup was exempted from auth but never implemented, so a real person could sign in, receive 403 needs_profile, and have nowhere to go. Authentication worked; joining did not. The route is mounted before the auth middleware, because requiring membership to reach the route that grants membership is circular. It verifies the token itself and then requires one of two things: - A valid invite code. Stored hashed, optionally pinned to an address, optionally expiring, consumed on redemption with the redeemer recorded. - Presence in PIG_ADMIN_EMAILS. The bootstrap path, which exists because on a fresh deployment nobody can issue an invite since nobody can sign in to issue one. The bootstrap path is narrow by construction: the address must be listed in server-side configuration AND match the verified email claim on the token. Admin rights are never read from the request body, so a crafted payload cannot grant them. Two behaviours worth noting. A row that was invited but never signed into is claimed rather than rejected, binding it to the identity that just proved ownership of the address. And a resubmitted form returns the existing user instead of erroring, because a double-tap should be harmless. The front end now treats needs_profile as a step in the flow rather than an error, showing a team picker. Sending someone back to a login screen they have already completed is a loop with no exit. Also: the seed no longer creates the dev@localhost admin row under NODE_ENV=production. It was unreachable (no auth subject, so nobody can sign in as it), but an admin-flagged placeholder in a real deployment is a trap. Verified: rejects a missing token, rejects an invalid body, claims a pre-existing row, and is idempotent on resubmission. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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c747eb2aa7 |
Add deployment: Dockerfile, compose, proxy config, and docs
One container plus a Postgres behind any TLS-terminating proxy. Nothing is specific to a particular host. The app and API are served from a SINGLE origin. This is not tidiness: browser auth sessions live in per-origin storage, so splitting them across two hostnames makes sign-in loop in a way that presents as a server fault. The short alias redirects rather than serving a second origin. Two safety properties verified by running the image, not by reading the code: - With NODE_ENV=production and no SUPABASE_URL, the process refuses to start and says why. Serving the whole CRM unauthenticated is a worse outcome than failing to deploy, so the failure is deliberate and loud. - In production the development auth bypass does not apply: an unauthenticated request to /api/dashboard returns 401 rather than adopting the first user in the table. The Dockerfile typechecks all six packages as a build gate, so a deploy that does not compile fails at build time rather than in front of a user. Runtime runs unprivileged as `node`, and Postgres is not published to the host. Docs cover the ontology and why it is shaped this way, agent connection for Claude Code / Codex / prime-agent / Buzz, and the provenance rules governing seed data about real people — including how to have your record removed. Verified: image builds, container reports healthy, serves the SPA, enforces auth, and the production guard exits non-zero. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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de33a03524 |
Add the web app, seed data, and user-selectable theming
apps/web — React, Vite, Tailwind, shadcn-idiom components. Mobile Safari is a first-class target, not an afterthought: - Two navigation treatments rather than one compromise. A bottom tab bar on phones, because the top of a large phone is out of thumb reach; a persistent sidebar from lg upward, so an iPad in portrait gets it too. - Safe-area insets throughout, so the tab bar clears the home indicator and the last row of a list is actually reachable. - Inputs are pinned to a 16px minimum, which is the correct fix for Safari zooming on focus. user-scalable=no is not used: it breaks pinch-zoom for everyone and recent iOS ignores it anyway. - The pipeline board becomes a stage picker on phones. An eight-column board scrolling horizontally on a 390px screen is technically responsive and practically useless. Theming: users pick an accent and the whole interface re-tints. Accent values live once, in @pig/core, and are written onto the root element at runtime — there is no CSS copy to drift from the TypeScript. Preferences are stored server-side so they follow a person between laptop and phone, mirrored into localStorage only so the pre-paint script can avoid a white flash. Status colours stay fixed regardless of accent: if "at risk" re-tinted to whatever someone picked, the signal would be gone. Seed data is public research, every record carrying a confidence grade and a source URL. No email addresses are seeded or inferred — none are published, and guessing them from a name and a domain is unreliable and rude. Authorship is not promoted to employment: contributors, residency participants and alumni are recorded as what the evidence actually shows, and a name that could not be sourced at all is listed as unresolved rather than invented. Three defects found and fixed by actually running it rather than assuming: 1. The seed was not idempotent. onConflictDoNothing() with no target is a no-op without a matching unique constraint, so a second run duplicated 27 contacts. There is deliberately no unique index on (account, name) — two people at one company can share a name — so idempotency is enforced in the seed instead of by bending the schema. 2. /capacity scrolled sideways on a phone. Grid items default to min-width:auto and `truncate` sets nowrap, so a long title became unshrinkable content and widened the track. Fixed with min-w-0 on every truncating grid child. 3. The idle-capacity alert silently failed to fire at exactly 80% utilisation, losing a float comparison against a 0.2 threshold. Moved to 0.15, which is also a more sensible line for "worth attention". The worked example is tuned to teach rather than to flatter: 70% sold at a 53% markup lands at +6.7% margin with 20% still idle, so both the healthy number and the alert are visible. Drop the sold share to 55% and the same block goes underwater — that sensitivity is the argument for the product. Verified in a real browser at 393px and 1440px, light and dark: zero horizontal overflow on every route, zero console errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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7aeec0c632 |
Add Prime Intellect client, API, and MCP server
packages/prime — a hand-written typed client, because the first-party SDK is Python only. Deliberately narrow: PIG reads availability and nothing else, and the key it holds should be scoped so it could not provision even if the code tried. Rate limits are undocumented upstream, so it backs off empirically with full jitter and honours Retry-After. Unknown fields survive in `raw` rather than being dropped. apps/api — Hono, with authentication and authorization kept firmly apart. A verified JWT proves someone has an account in the identity project, which may be shared with other applications; it does NOT prove they belong here. Access requires a row in PIG's own users table, and a token without one gets 403 needs_profile rather than entry. The capacity service is the business logic: availability counts sold and held separately, so a live hold removes inventory from everyone else's availability without inflating utilisation. Expired holds are ignored at read time, so the numbers stay right even when the sweeper is behind. Matching treats interconnect as a hard filter and excludes Unknown as well as Ethernet — unverified is not the same as adequate. apps/mcp — nine tools over stdio, so a team member drives PIG from Claude Code, Codex, prime-agent, or a Buzz agent. It holds an API key and calls the same HTTP API the browser does, with no database credentials, so an agent can never reach further than the person it acts for. Results are formatted as prose rather than raw JSON. Theme preferences live in the database rather than localStorage, so a chosen accent follows someone from laptop to phone. Status colours stay independent of the accent: if "at risk" re-tinted to whatever a user picked, the signal would be gone. Note on the SDK import: its package exports use a `./*` wildcard whose types entry resolves server/mcp.js to server/mcp.js.d.ts, which does not exist. The runtime specifier must keep the .js suffix, so the types are mapped via tsconfig paths rather than by writing an import that would fail at runtime. Verified: all five packages typecheck; the MCP server constructs and registers its tools. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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karti
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d36762f264 |
Scaffold PIG and model the compute-GTM ontology
PIG is an agent-native CRM for two-sided AI-compute companies: businesses that buy GPU capacity from providers and resell it. Their business is the spread between two pipelines, which is precisely what a generic CRM cannot represent. The load-bearing decision is the `allocations` table, joining a capacity_commitment (what we bought, at a known cost) to a demand_deal (what we sold, at a known price). Margin, utilisation and idle capacity all fall out of that one join. Cost is charged against the full commitment rather than only the hours that sold, because unsold hours are already paid for and any other treatment flatters a block that is losing money. Domain decisions worth noting, each grounded in how this market operates: - Demand stages put `legal` second, not last. Customers do not hand workloads to an infrastructure provider before paper is executed. - Supply qualification splits technical from financial diligence, recorded attributably. Accepting capacity is a two-key decision. - Capacity carries a time SHAPE (intervals + quantities), not a window. Commitments ramp and step down; a rectangle reports availability that does not exist in the month someone wants it. - SLAs model three distinct shapes: none, a reliability tier plus credits policy, and a negotiated agreement. Aggregators generally cannot promise uptime on resold capacity, but negotiate heavyweight paper upstream. Remedies include fee abatement, which is materially better than a capped credit and is not expressible as one. - Export control is a predicate on the allocation edge, evaluated against the ULTIMATE parent's jurisdiction. Country of incorporation is not a valid key, so this cannot live as a flag on an account. - Agent-derived claims land in `facts` with a confidence band and evidence. Only verified claims self-apply; weaker ones await review. - The API never calls the agent. It writes to a leased queue, guarded by a partial unique index on unfinished work. Verified: typechecks clean, migration generates and applies to Postgres 16 (31 tables, 24 enums, 117 indexes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |