# 🐷 PIG — Prime Intellect Growth **An open-source, agent-native CRM for two-sided AI-compute companies.** [![License: Apache 2.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Apache_2.0-blue.svg)](./LICENSE) *Self-hostable. Auditable. Built for teams that buy GPU capacity on one side and sell it on the other.*
--- ## Why this exists A company that aggregates GPU capacity and resells it does not run one pipeline. It runs two, and its business is the spread between them. Today that spread is usually managed in a spreadsheet with a margin calculator in column K, a document of supplier terms, and a general-purpose CRM that has no idea what an H100-hour is. Salesforce, HubSpot and Attio model a single pipeline of deals against companies. They have no concept of **inventory**, no concept of a **commitment you already bought and are paying for whether or not it sells**, and therefore no way to answer the question the business turns on: > Which contracted capacity is sold, to whom, at what margin — and what is idle > right now? PIG is one ledger that knows the domain. The load-bearing table is [`allocations`](./packages/db/src/schema/allocations.ts), which joins a `capacity_commitment` (what you bought, at a known cost) to a `demand_deal` (what you sold, at a known price). Margin, utilisation and idle capacity all fall out of that one join. Everything else is plumbing that keeps the ledger honest. **Cost is charged against the full commitment, not only the hours that sold.** Unsold hours are already paid for. Charging only the allocated share reports a healthy margin on a block that is losing money, which is precisely the failure PIG exists to prevent. There is a test pinning it. ## Who it is for PIG models three teams, because two-sided compute companies have three constituencies competing for the same scarce capacity. | Team | Job to be done | |---|---| | **Supply** | Source, qualify, price and contract GPU capacity from providers | | **Demand** | Sell compute and post-training; renew and expand accounts | | **Research** | Consume capacity internally — real burn, no revenue | Research is a first-class tenant rather than an afterthought: internal burn competes with revenue for the same GPUs, and margin arithmetic that cannot see it is wrong. The team set is configurable in `packages/core/src/ontology.ts`. PIG ships with these three because they match the structure of the company it was designed for, not because they are universal. ## Screenshots > **Placeholder — fresh captures needed.** The application shell was rebuilt as > a three-pane layout (header, collapsible sidebar rail, docked Piggy) and > every screenshot taken before that redesign now misrepresents the product. > Rather than ship misleading images, this section is deliberately empty until > the new shell is re-shot at desktop and at 393px, in light and dark. > > Pages to capture: `/` Overview, `/margin`, `/capacity` (the matcher), > `/calendar`, `/piggy` docked beside a record. ## The two-sided data model Forty-seven tables, but the shape is small. These are the ones that carry the thesis: | Table | What it holds | Why it is not in a generic CRM | |---|---|---| | `capacity_commitments` | What you bought: term, GPU-hours, cost per GPU-hour, floor and ceiling, and a **shape** (`{intervals[], quantities[]}`) | Real contracts ramp across tranches and step down at checkpoints; a single start/end/total reports availability that does not exist in the month someone wants it | | `demand_deals` | What you are selling: ACV, product line, MSA/DPA state, stage | The paper state is a separate axis from the stage, because paper gates delivery | | `supply_deals` | The other pipeline: sourcing a provider through diligence to live | Generic CRMs have one pipeline and call the supplier a vendor | | **`allocations`** | **The join.** Commitment × deal × GPU-hours × window × status | This is the whole product. Margin, utilisation and idle all derive from it | | `inventory_listings` | Market availability mirrored from the Prime Intellect API | Sync is a straight field mapping, not an ETL project | | `capacity_requests` | What a customer asked for, whether or not it could be served | Unservable demand is the signal for what to buy next | | `contracts` + `sla_terms` + `sla_metric_targets` + `contract_obligations` | Polymorphic over party and type — MSA, DPA, SLA, order form, capacity commitment — with negotiated SLA terms and dated obligations | The supply side negotiates heavyweight paper; the self-serve demand side runs on a reliability tier and a credits policy instead | | `export_authorizations`, `compliance_artifacts`, `compliance_decisions` | Export-control determinations recorded **on the allocation edge**, with reasoning and rule version | US controls apply an ultimate-parent test that reaches through the corporate tree, so country of incorporation is not a valid key | | `facts` | Every agent-derived claim, with score, band, evidence excerpt and source URL | An agent allowed to write unattributed claims will eventually write a wrong one and nobody will be able to tell which | | `agent_tasks` / `agent_runs` / `agent_actions` | The queue the API writes to and the agent drains, plus what it did | The API never calls the model; it writes a row | Two pipelines, with stages taken from how the market operates: ``` Demand: qualification → legal → scoping → proposal → procurement → POC → deployment → expansion (+ closed_won / closed_lost) Supply: sourced → qualifying → technical diligence → financial diligence → pricing → contracting → onboarding → live → renewal (+ churned / rejected) ``` **Legal sits second** in the demand pipeline. MSA and DPA execution gates the deal rather than closing it. Most CRMs put contracts at the end of the funnel and are wrong about it for this market. Three further decisions worth knowing before you read the schema: - **Holds reserve; they do not sell.** A live hold removes capacity from everyone else's availability — otherwise two sellers promise the same GPUs — but never counts toward utilisation or revenue. - **Security tiers are ranked, not labelled.** `community_cloud` < `secure_cloud` < `government`, and a requirement is satisfied only from at or above its tier. - **Money is integer cents**, rounded exactly once, at the boundary. ## Self-hosting ### Requirements Node 22+, pnpm 11+ (pinned by `packageManager`; `corepack enable` installs it), and a PostgreSQL 16 database that PIG owns exclusively. ### Development ```bash corepack enable pnpm install docker run -d --name pig-dev -p 5432:5432 \ -e POSTGRES_USER=pig -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=pig -e POSTGRES_DB=pig \ postgres:16-alpine export DATABASE_URL=postgres://pig:pig@localhost:5432/pig pnpm run db:migrate pnpm run db:seed # optional — sourced, cited, confidence-graded people pnpm run db:demo # optional — a plausible demo book, prefixed "DEMO — " pnpm run dev:api # :8920 pnpm run dev:web # :5173, proxies /api to :8920 ``` With no identity provider configured, **authentication is disabled in development** and every request runs as the first user in the table. `loadConfig` refuses to start with `NODE_ENV=production` in that state, so it cannot leak into a deployment. ### Production ```bash cp .env.example .env # then edit docker compose -p pig up -d db docker compose -p pig run --rm --no-deps app pnpm exec tsx packages/db/src/migrate.ts docker compose -p pig up -d --build app ``` Migrate from a one-off container **before** the app starts, not with `exec`: a release that queries a table its migration has not yet created crash-loops before you can attach to it. Full deployment notes, including the reverse proxy, the release poller and rollback semantics, are in [`deploy/README.md`](./deploy/README.md). ### Every environment variable Read from `apps/api/src/lib/config.ts` (API), `apps/piggy/src/config.ts` (Piggy) and `docker-compose.yml`. **Bold** means no default. #### Required | Variable | Default | Notes | |---|---|---| | **`DATABASE_URL`** | — | The only unconditionally required value. PIG owns this database exclusively | | **`POSTGRES_PASSWORD`** | — | Compose only; `docker-compose.yml` refuses to start without it | In production you must additionally set **either** `SUPABASE_URL` **or** `PIG_OIDC_ISSUER`. The API throws at boot with neither. #### Identity | Variable | Default | Notes | |---|---|---| | `SUPABASE_URL` | unset | Hosted path. Absent in development ⇒ auth disabled | | `SUPABASE_ANON_KEY` | unset | Public by design; served to the browser via `/api/config` | | `SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY` | unset | Only for administrative provisioning and self-registration. Warns at boot when set | | `PIG_OIDC_ISSUER` | unset | On-premises path. **Takes precedence over `SUPABASE_URL`** | | `PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI` | discovered | Set it to skip discovery on an air-gapped network | | `PIG_OIDC_AUDIENCE` | unset | Strongly recommended: without it, any token your provider issued for any application in the same tenant is accepted here. Warns, does not refuse | | `PIG_OIDC_EMAIL_CLAIMS` | provider defaults | Comma-separated, in preference order | #### Server | Variable | Default | Notes | |---|---|---| | `PIG_PORT` | `8920` | | | `PIG_PUBLIC_URL` | `http://localhost:8920` | The single origin the app is served from; CORS and the Google redirect are validated against it | | `NODE_ENV` | `development` | `production` activates the identity-provider guard | | `PIG_ADMIN_EMAILS` | `''` | Comma-separated. Every address must already have an account — an unregistered address here is a standing offer of admin rights to whoever claims it first | | `PIG_INVITE_CODE` | unset | Set it to gate signup | | `PIG_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | unset | Base64-encoded 32 bytes. Required for Notion and Google OAuth; secrets written in the admin UI need it | #### Prime Intellect | Variable | Default | Notes | |---|---|---| | `PRIME_API_KEY` | unset | Scope it to `Availability → Read` only | | `PRIME_API_BASE` | `https://api.primeintellect.ai` | The compute/pods host. Inference is a *different* host — see below | | `PRIME_SYNC_ENABLED` | `false` | Warns if on without a key | | `PRIME_SYNC_INTERVAL_MINUTES` | `30` | | #### Piggy The API and the Piggy container read overlapping but distinct sets. | Variable | Default | Read by | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | `PIGGY_ENABLED` | `false` | API | Gates the chat surface | | **`PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY`** | — | Piggy | Required by the Piggy process. The model credential never reaches the API container | | `PIGGY_INFERENCE_BASE` | `https://api.pinference.ai/api/v1` | both | OpenAI-compatible | | `PIGGY_MODEL` | `nvidia/nemotron-3-nano-30b-a3b` | both | Admin-selectable at runtime too | | `PIGGY_LEASE_SECONDS` | `300` | both | Queue lease duration | | `PIGGY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS` | `2000` | Piggy | | | `PIGGY_MAX_TOKENS` | `1024` | Piggy | | | `PIGGY_WORKER_ID` | `hostname:pid` | Piggy | | | `PIGGY_INTERNAL_URL` | unset | API | `http://piggy:8931` under Compose | | **`PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN`** | — | both | Min 32 chars; required by the Piggy process. Never put it in a query string | | `PIGGY_CHAT_HOST` | `127.0.0.1` | Piggy | | | `PIGGY_CHAT_PORT` | `8931` | Piggy | Never published to the host | | `PIGGY_CHAT_ALLOW_NON_LOOPBACK` | `false` | Piggy | Compose sets `true`, because the API reaches it across the Compose network | #### Integrations — all optional, all validated as a group Setting one member of a group without the others fails at boot rather than half-working. | Group | Variables | |---|---| | Slack | `SLACK_BOT_TOKEN`, `SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET` | | Buzz | `BUZZ_RELAY_URL`, `BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY`, `BUZZ_AUTH_TAG` | | Notion import | `NOTION_CLIENT_ID`, `NOTION_CLIENT_SECRET`, `NOTION_REDIRECT_URI` (+ `PIG_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) | | Google Sheets import | `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID`, `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET`, `GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI` (+ `PIG_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) | `GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI` must be exactly `/oauth/google/callback`. ## Architecture A pnpm monorepo. Around 45k lines of TypeScript including tests, 261 tests across five packages, green CI. ``` apps/ web/ React 19 + Vite + Tailwind + shadcn-idiom components api/ Hono HTTP API — auth, validation, capacity and contract services piggy/ The agent: a lease-based queue worker plus a private chat server mcp/ MCP server (stdio) — 9 tools cli/ `pig`, the HTTP surface for scripts and agent kernels packages/ core/ Ontology, permissions, margin arithmetic, palette — no I/O db/ Drizzle schema (47 tables), 13 migrations, seed and demo data prime/ Typed client for the Prime Intellect compute API docs/ ontology.md, build-plan.md, agents.md, seed-data.md deploy/ Caddyfile example, autodeploy units, deployment notes ``` Three rules hold the shape: **Intelligence never lives in the API.** Handlers validate, authorise, call a service, serialise. Research, enrichment, scoring and matching heuristics live in the service layer or in the agent. The API signals the agent by *writing a row to `agent_tasks`*, never by calling it — so the queue survives the agent being down and no request thread ever blocks on a model. **Authentication is not authorisation.** A verified JWT proves someone has an account in an identity provider PIG may share with another application. Access additionally requires a row in PIG's own `users` table; a token without one gets `403 needs_profile`, which the front end turns into a join flow rather than a login screen they have already completed. Both providers reduce to "verify a bearer token, return a subject and an email" behind `apps/api/src/lib/auth-provider.ts`. **Writes go through one chokepoint.** `apps/api/src/lib/mutation.ts` derives zod schemas from the ontology, applies the capability check, runs the write and its audit activity in one transaction, and returns a consistent error shape. ## The RBAC model, as it now stands Eleven capabilities, in `packages/core/src/permissions.ts`, resolved from team membership and role and shared by the API and the browser so a disabled button and a 403 cannot disagree. Roles are ranked, and every rule is "at or above": `viewer` < `member` < `lead` < `admin`. A platform admin (an address in `PIG_ADMIN_EMAILS`) holds everything, platform-wide. **Writes are team-scoped:** | Capability | Teams | Minimum role | |---|---|---| | `deal:write` | supply, demand | member | | `commitment:write` | supply | lead | | `contract:sign` | supply, demand | admin | | `activity:write` | all | member | | `data:import` | all | admin | | `fact:review` | research | admin | | `integration:connect` | all | admin | | `settings:admin` | — | platform admin only | **Reads are platform-wide, deliberately:** | Capability | Teams | Minimum role | Covers | |---|---|---|---| | `book:read` | all | viewer | Accounts, contacts, both pipelines, contracts, growth, facts | | `economics:read` | supply, demand | member | Supplier cost, break-even price, margin, idle, inventory, the dashboard | | `team:read` | all | viewer | The roster | Read grants are **not** team-scoped, and that is a decision rather than an omission: no row-level team filter exists anywhere in the query layer, so a "demand only" read grant would be a promise the guard could not keep. The honest model is that a read capability is held or it is not, and the *role* required to hold it is what separates the roster from the cost book. `economics:read` is the one that matters — supplier cost per GPU-hour and break-even price *are* the business. ⚠️ **The read half is written and tested but not yet enforced.** The policy table (`apps/api/src/routes/read-guards.ts`) and its middleware exist, and `read-governance.test.ts` fails when a GET appears that no rule covers — but `createReadGuardRoutes` is not mounted in `app.ts`, so today every authenticated member can read the whole book including cost. See [limitations](#what-is-not-built-yet). ## The agent surface PIG is a first-class application for agents *and* for humans, and neither is a degraded view of the other. There are two distinct surfaces. ### Piggy — the in-app agent `apps/piggy` is one image running two processes' worth of behaviour: - **The queue worker** claims a task with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` inside a transaction, holds a renewable lease (default 300s, renewed at half the interval), and aborts its own work if it ever loses that lease — so two workers can never both be mid-flight on one task. Failures retry with exponential backoff capped at one hour, up to the task's `maxAttempts`. Every attempt writes an `agent_runs` row with the model, the input, the token counts and either a summary or the error. Its tool set is exactly two: `pig_get_subject` and `pig_record_fact`, and a fact is refused without both a source URL and an evidence excerpt. - **The chat server** listens on `127.0.0.1:8931` and is never published to the host. The API authenticates the user, forwards bounded context, and calls it with a shared internal bearer token. Chat is **read-only**: seven tools (`pig_get_record`, `pig_get_account_lifecycle` and five page-scoped summaries), each of which aggregates first and returns at most a handful of exemplar rows, because interactive chat runs at 1024 max tokens across at most four turns. Ambient coding tools are rejected before inference by an explicit boundary check. Piggy is off by default. `PIGGY_ENABLED` defaults to `false` and the Compose service sits behind `profiles: ['piggy']`, so a default `docker compose up` starts the CRM without it: ```bash docker compose -p pig --profile piggy up -d --build ``` ### The MCP server — for the agent you already use `apps/mcp` speaks **stdio** and holds an API key. It calls the same HTTP API a browser does: no database credentials, no privileged path, and deliberately no tool that provisions infrastructure, spends money or emails a customer. Nine tools, because a sprawling tool list measurably degrades model performance: | Tool | What it answers | |---|---| | `pig_whoami` | Who am I acting for, and which teams am I on? | | `pig_my_pipeline` | Where are we? What needs attention? | | `pig_capacity_match` | What have we bought that would serve this customer? | | `pig_margin_report` | What is each block earning against what it cost? | | `pig_idle_capacity` | What are we paying for and not selling? | | `pig_inventory_search` | What could we buy to cover demand we cannot serve? | | `pig_search` | Find an account | | `pig_get_account` | Everything about one account | | `pig_log_activity` | Record a call, meeting or note | Mint a key in **Settings → API keys** (shown once), then run it from a clone — `@pig/mcp` is a workspace package and is not published to npm: ```bash export PIG_URL=https://your-pig-host export PIG_API_KEY=pig_... claude mcp add pig -- pnpm --dir /path/to/pig exec tsx apps/mcp/src/stdio.ts ``` There is also a `pig` CLI with `--json` output for scripts and agent kernels; see [docs/agents.md](./docs/agents.md). ## Shipping — tag to deploy CI is Gitea Actions, one sequence, about two minutes. It typechecks every package, applies the migration chain **twice** to a real empty Postgres, asserts the seed is idempotent, runs 261 unit tests and the critical-path E2E, boots the server and curls it, builds the front end, checks the inline theme script still hashes to the value the proxy's CSP allows, and builds the Docker image. Shipping is two steps and the second one is a human: ```bash git tag release-2026-08-13 && git push origin release-2026-08-13 ``` 1. A push to `main` runs `verify` and stops. **Nothing deploys.** 2. A `release-*` tag runs the same `verify`, then `publish` pushes `git.karti.ai/pig/pig:` and `:` to the registry. 3. Within five minutes `pig-autodeploy.timer` on the production host notices the newest release tag has a different digest, checks the tree out at that tag, and runs `scripts/deploy.sh` with `PIG_IMAGE` set. The direction of travel is the point: no credential on the shared CI runner can execute anything on the production host. The host holds a pull-only token and fetches. `deploy.sh` dumps the database first, gates on health, the unauthenticated-401 check and a public-origin body marker, and rolls back to the previous image if a gate fails — exiting 1 when the previous image was restored and 3 when the release under test is still live, because that is the one thing an on-call needs at 04:00. ## What is not built yet Said plainly, because you are going to grep the repo anyway. **Read authorisation is not enforced.** As above: the policy, the middleware and the governance test all exist; the router line that mounts them does not. Any authenticated member can currently read cost and margin regardless of team or role. This is the most significant gap in the product and it is one line in `app.ts`. **Four route modules are written, tested and never mounted.** `routes/read-guards.ts`, `routes/learn.ts`, `routes/hubspot.ts` and `routes/hubspot-webhook.ts` are all absent from `app.ts`. Consequences: the **Learn** page is in the navigation and its API answers 404, and the HubSpot integration — OAuth, connections, sync jobs, webhook verification, seven `hubspot_*` tables — is unreachable. `routes/activities.ts` is likewise unmounted, but harmlessly: an older inline `POST /api/activities` in `app.ts` still serves it. **Six of the eight declared agent task kinds are never enqueued.** The worker is complete and generic, but only `enrich_account` and `enrich_contact` are ever written to `agent_tasks` (both from record creation). `write_brief`, `match_capacity`, `detect_idle_capacity`, `summarise_pipeline`, `watch_renewal` and `research_supplier` are declared in the ontology and nothing produces them. Piggy therefore does far less than the queue implies — not because the machinery is missing, but because nothing asks. **Piggy chat cannot write.** By design for now, but worth stating: the interactive agent reads and cites; it cannot create or update a CRM record. **The MCP server is stdio only.** There is no Streamable HTTP transport and no `/mcp` endpoint on the API, so remote MCP clients cannot connect over the network — each user runs the server locally against their own API key. The package is also not published to npm, so `npx @pig/mcp` does not work. **No row-level or team-scoped read filtering exists** anywhere in the query layer. Every read returns the whole book. This is why read capabilities are platform-wide rather than per-team, and it is the thing to build before PIG serves a company where that is not acceptable. **`.env.example` is incomplete.** `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` and `PIG_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` are both load-bearing and both missing from it; the table above is authoritative. `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is declared in the API config and read by nothing. **Not started at all:** email or calendar ingestion, forecasting, quota and attainment, invoicing or billing reconciliation, a public API beyond what the MCP tools cover, multi-tenancy of any kind, and any mobile application. PIG is responsive to 393px; it is not a native app. ## Documentation - **[AGENTS.md](./AGENTS.md) — start here if you are joining this codebase.** Architecture rules, the traps that have already bitten, and conventions. - [Ontology](./docs/ontology.md) — the domain model, and why it is shaped this way - [Build plan](./docs/build-plan.md) — what shipped, what remains, in dependency order - [Agent integration](./docs/agents.md) — MCP clients and the CLI - [Seed data provenance](./docs/seed-data.md) — every claim, graded and cited - [Deployment](./deploy/README.md) — self-hosting, the release poller, rollback ## A note on seed data PIG ships with a roster of publicly documented people so the application is legible on first run. Every record carries a confidence grade and a source URL, both shown in the interface. **No email addresses are included or inferred.** Records that could not be independently sourced are marked as such rather than quietly presented as fact, and people who are demonstrably *not* staff — alumni, residency participants — are labelled accordingly. Seeding is opt-in (`pnpm run db:seed`) and never automatic. See [docs/seed-data.md](./docs/seed-data.md). If you are seeded here and would rather not be, open an issue and the record will be removed. ## Licence Apache License 2.0 — see [LICENSE](./LICENSE) and [NOTICE](./NOTICE). The architectural debts to [Comp AI CRM](https://github.com/trycompai/crm) (MIT) and [Buzz](https://github.com/block/buzz) (Apache-2.0) are credited in NOTICE. No source code was copied from either.