13dec6b4b8
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
97 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
97 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
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import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
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import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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import type { Config } from '../src/lib/config';
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import {
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inviteMetadata,
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isInferenceEndpoint,
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memberAccessSchema,
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platformSettingsResponse,
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platformSettingsSchema,
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} from '../src/routes/admin-settings';
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import { decryptSecret, encryptSecret, SecretConfigurationError } from '../src/lib/secrets';
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describe('admin settings decisions', () => {
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it('keeps inference separate from the Prime compute API host', () => {
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assert.equal(isInferenceEndpoint('https://api.pinference.ai/api/v1'), true);
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assert.equal(isInferenceEndpoint('https://api.primeintellect.ai'), false);
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assert.equal(
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platformSettingsSchema.safeParse({
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piggyInferenceBase: 'https://api.primeintellect.ai/v1',
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}).success,
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false,
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);
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});
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it('encrypts credentials with authenticated random envelopes and requires an external key', () => {
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const key = randomBytes(32).toString('base64');
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const first = encryptSecret('prime-secret', key);
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const second = encryptSecret('prime-secret', key);
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assert.notEqual(first, second);
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assert.equal(decryptSecret(first, key), 'prime-secret');
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assert.throws(
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() => encryptSecret('prime-secret', undefined),
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(error: unknown) => error instanceof SecretConfigurationError,
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);
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});
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it('never returns a stored key, ciphertext, or invite hash in metadata', () => {
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const now = new Date('2026-08-12T12:00:00.000Z');
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const settings = platformSettingsResponse(
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{
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id: 'default',
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piggyModel: 'nvidia/nemotron-3-nano-30b-a3b',
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piggyInferenceBase: 'https://api.pinference.ai/api/v1',
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piggyEnabled: true,
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primeApiKeyEncrypted: 'v1.iv.tag.ciphertext',
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primeApiKeyUpdatedAt: now,
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// Present so the row is a complete PlatformSettings. The assertion
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// below is that nothing secret escapes into the metadata, and the
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// Learn share code is exactly the sort of thing that must not.
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learnAccessCode: 'carlthefog',
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learnAccessCodeUpdatedAt: null,
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primeSyncEnabled: true,
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primeSyncIntervalMinutes: 30,
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updatedByUserId: null,
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updatedAt: now,
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},
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{
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PRIME_API_KEY: 'environment-secret',
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PRIME_API_BASE: 'https://api.primeintellect.ai',
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} as Config,
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);
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assert.equal(JSON.stringify(settings).includes('ciphertext'), false);
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assert.equal(JSON.stringify(settings).includes('environment-secret'), false);
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const invite = inviteMetadata({
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id: '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001',
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codeHash: 'never-return-this',
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email: null,
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team: null,
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role: 'member',
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createdByUserId: null,
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expiresAt: null,
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usesRemaining: 1,
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scopeNote: null,
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redeemedByUserId: null,
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redeemedAt: null,
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revokedAt: null,
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createdAt: now,
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});
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assert.equal('codeHash' in invite, false);
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});
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it('rejects duplicate team assignments rather than depending on a database conflict', () => {
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assert.equal(
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memberAccessSchema.safeParse({
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isPlatformAdmin: false,
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memberships: [
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{ team: 'supply', role: 'member' },
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{ team: 'supply', role: 'admin' },
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],
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}).success,
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false,
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);
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});
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});
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