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pig/apps/api/test/records.test.ts
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Rebuild the shell, add Calendar and Learn, and govern reads
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things
worth knowing before reading the diff:

RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is
stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago.
So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one
is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated
member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull
per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and
every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business,
that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read,
a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member.

THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen.
Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled
against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment
creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply.

POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability
check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect.
It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write.

The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account
switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to
the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its
bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on,
and gains the sidebar as a sheet.

Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table,
because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and
commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the
whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts,
which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be
alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere.

Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be
opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped
learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal
and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing
check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible"
is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts
a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and
/api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without.

CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a
release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can
execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both
halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the
host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a
public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`,
without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local.

Tests 141 -> 261.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 15:02:48 -07:00

117 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
import type { Database } from '@pig/db';
import { accounts, activities, agentTasks } from '@pig/db';
import { AuthError } from '../src/lib/auth';
import { executeMutation, MutationError } from '../src/lib/mutation';
import {
accountSupportsTeam,
createAccountMutationDefinition,
createDemandDealMutationDefinition,
} from '../src/routes/records';
import { principal } from './helpers/principal';
const demandPrincipal = principal();
describe('record-side decisions', () => {
it('makes dual-side accounts available to both commercial teams', () => {
assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'demand'), true);
assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'supply'), true);
assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'research'), false);
assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('supply', 'demand'), false);
assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('demand', 'supply'), false);
});
it('does not let a demand writer create a supply-only account', async () => {
const db = {
transaction: async (work: (tx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => work({}),
} as unknown as Database;
await assert.rejects(
executeMutation(
db,
demandPrincipal,
async () => ({
name: 'Supply only',
side: 'supply',
}),
createAccountMutationDefinition(),
),
(error: unknown) =>
error instanceof AuthError && error.code === 'insufficient_permission',
);
});
});
describe('record mutation evidence and relationships', () => {
it('queues enrichment and writes the audit event in the account transaction', async () => {
const events: string[] = [];
const created = {
id: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
name: 'Customer',
side: 'demand',
};
const tx = {
insert: (table: unknown) => ({
values: (row: unknown) => {
events.push(
table === accounts ? 'account' : table === agentTasks ? 'agent-task' : table === activities ? 'activity' : 'unknown',
);
return { returning: async () => [created], row };
},
}),
};
const db = {
transaction: async (work: (transaction: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => {
events.push('begin');
const result = await work(tx);
events.push('commit');
return result;
},
} as unknown as Database;
await executeMutation(
db,
demandPrincipal,
async () => ({ name: 'Customer', side: 'demand' }),
createAccountMutationDefinition(),
);
assert.deepEqual(events, ['begin', 'account', 'agent-task', 'activity', 'commit']);
});
it('rejects a demand deal attached to a supply-only account', async () => {
const tx = {
select: () => ({
from: () => ({
where: () => ({
limit: async () => [{ id: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001', side: 'supply' }],
}),
}),
}),
};
const db = {
transaction: async (work: (transaction: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => work(tx),
} as unknown as Database;
await assert.rejects(
executeMutation(
db,
demandPrincipal,
async () => ({
accountId: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
name: 'Impossible relationship',
productLine: 'compute_reserved',
stage: 'qualification',
currency: 'USD',
msaExecuted: false,
dpaExecuted: false,
}),
createDemandDealMutationDefinition(),
),
(error: unknown) =>
error instanceof MutationError && error.code === 'relationship_mismatch',
);
});
});