karti
c821b2ca07
The seam existed with only a Supabase implementation, so an on-prem deployment had no way to authenticate. A customer running PIG inside their own network already has Okta, Entra, Keycloak, Auth0 or Google Workspace; asking them to stand up a second identity system is a serious adoption tax and in a regulated environment usually refused outright. Setting PIG_OIDC_ISSUER is normally the whole configuration — the JWKS is discovered from the issuer's well-known document. PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI skips discovery entirely for an air-gapped network. OIDC takes precedence over Supabase so an on-prem install can leave the hosted values in its environment file without them quietly taking over. Three decisions worth stating: Discovery is resolved lazily and the FAILURE is not cached. Doing it per request would put the customer's identity provider on the critical path of every API call; doing it eagerly at boot would mean their IdP rebooting takes the CRM down with it. So it happens on first use and retries on the next request. The audience check is optional but warned about loudly. Without it, a token the provider issued for ANY other application in the same tenant verifies here — a token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session. It cannot be mandatory because some providers legitimately issue single-audience tokens. Email falls back through email, preferred_username and upn, because providers disagree, but a preferred_username without an "@" is ignored — PIG keys membership on the address, and a bare username must never become an account identity. Also fixed a warning that claimed "authentication is DISABLED" on a correctly configured OIDC deployment. That is worse than silence: an operator who reads it on a secure install learns to ignore the warnings. The dev bypass itself was already correct — it keys on the resolved provider rather than on Supabase. 18 new tests, most of them about what the provider must REFUSE: a foreign signing key, a foreign issuer, a token for a different application, an expired token, a token with no subject, and a discovery outage that must not become permanent. Keys are generated per test and the JWKS is served locally, so they run offline. Verified: production refuses to start with neither provider, starts with OIDC alone, enforces 401 on an unauthenticated request, and warns only about the genuinely missing admin list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploying PIG
PIG is an API/web container, a private Piggy worker/chat container and Postgres, behind any reverse proxy that terminates TLS. Nothing here is specific to a particular host.
1. DNS
Point the apex and www at the machine. Both must resolve before the proxy can
obtain a certificate.
A primeintellectgrowth.com -> <your IP>
A www.primeintellectgrowth.com -> <your IP>
2. Configuration
cp .env.example .env # then edit
The values that must be set for a production start:
| Variable | Why |
|---|---|
POSTGRES_PASSWORD |
Generate a fresh one; never reuse another service's |
PIG_PUBLIC_URL |
The single origin the app is served from |
SUPABASE_URL / SUPABASE_ANON_KEY |
Authentication. The app refuses to start in production without a Supabase URL, because it would otherwise serve the whole CRM unauthenticated |
PIG_ADMIN_EMAILS |
Who may administer. Every address here must already have an account — an unregistered address listed as an admin is a standing offer of admin rights to whoever claims it first |
PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY |
Model credential held only by the Piggy process |
PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN |
A generated 32+ character bearer token shared only by API and Piggy |
Optional: PRIME_API_KEY (scope it to Availability → Read only),
PIGGY_ENABLED, and the Slack and Buzz credentials.
Piggy listens on piggy:8931 inside the Compose network. The port is exposed to
other containers but never published to the host, and Caddy must not route to
it. The CRM API authenticates the user, forwards only bounded chat context, and
uses PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN in an Authorization header. Never put that token in
a query string, where proxies and access logs can retain it.
3. Start
docker compose -p pig up -d --build
docker compose -p pig exec app npx tsx packages/db/src/migrate.ts
docker compose -p pig exec app npx tsx packages/db/src/seed/index.ts # optional
When Piggy is enabled, start its private profile as well:
docker compose -p pig --profile piggy up -d --build
Use -p pig. A compose project that shares a name with a neighbouring stack
will adopt its volumes, which is a memorable way to lose a database.
4. Reverse proxy
See Caddyfile.example. Serve the app and API from the same origin.
Two things that will otherwise cost you an hour:
-
If other sites on the host use
bind <address>, yours must too. Caddy groups site blocks into servers by listen address. A block withoutbindlands in a separate server on:443, and the more specific listener wins for traffic arriving on that address — which is all public traffic after NAT. The symptom is a valid certificate, a 200 response, an empty body, and none of your headers. It looks like the app is broken; it is that the request never reached it. -
The CSP must carry the hash of the inline theme script in
index.html. That script sets light or dark before first paint so dark-mode users do not get a white flash. Editing it changes the hash and CSP will silently block it — the browser console prints the hash it expects.
5. Verify
curl -s https://primeintellectgrowth.com/api/health
# {"ok":true,"service":"pig","version":"0.1.0"}
Upgrading
git pull
docker compose -p pig up -d --build
docker compose -p pig exec app npx tsx packages/db/src/migrate.ts
Migrations are additive and safe to re-run; Drizzle tracks what has been applied. Take a dump before a major upgrade anyway:
docker compose -p pig exec db pg_dump -U pig pig | gzip > pig-$(date +%F).sql.gz
On-premises: using your own identity provider
PIG authenticates against any standards-compliant OIDC provider, which is how an install inside your own network works. Set:
PIG_OIDC_ISSUER=https://id.yourcompany.internal
PIG_OIDC_AUDIENCE=pig # the client/app id you registered for PIG
That is usually the whole configuration — the JWKS is discovered from the
issuer. On an air-gapped network, set PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI too and no discovery
request is made.
PIG_OIDC_ISSUER takes precedence over SUPABASE_URL, so the hosted values
can stay in the environment file without quietly taking over.
Set the audience. Without it, any token your provider issued for any application in the same tenant verifies here — a token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session. PIG warns about this at boot but cannot refuse, because some providers legitimately issue single-audience tokens.
Provisioning stays in PIG. Authenticating proves who someone is; it does not make them a member. They still need an invite, and their team and role live in PIG's database. That is deliberate — your directory should not have to model "supply lead versus demand member" for one application.
A note on the auth project
PIG verifies JWTs but authorizes from its own users table. If the Supabase
project is shared with another application, its users get nothing here until
they are explicitly invited. That is deliberate, and it is why a valid token can
still return 403 needs_profile.