pig/deploy

Deploying PIG

PIG is an API/web container, Postgres, and — when you ask for it — a private Piggy container running a Prime Agent session over the CRM, behind any reverse proxy that terminates TLS. Nothing here is specific to a particular host.

1. DNS

Point the apex and www at the machine. Both must resolve before the proxy can obtain a certificate.

A   primeintellectgrowth.com       -> <your IP>
A   www.primeintellectgrowth.com   -> <your IP>

2. Configuration

cp .env.example .env    # then edit

The values that must be set for a production start:

Variable	Why
POSTGRES_PASSWORD	Generate a fresh one; never reuse another service's
PIG_PUBLIC_URL	The single origin the app is served from
SUPABASE_URL / SUPABASE_ANON_KEY	Authentication. The app refuses to start in production without a Supabase URL, because it would otherwise serve the whole CRM unauthenticated
PIG_ADMIN_EMAILS	Who may administer. Every address here must already have an account — an unregistered address listed as an admin is a standing offer of admin rights to whoever claims it first
PIG_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY	Base64-encoded 32 bytes (openssl rand -base64 32). Only needed for the Notion and Google OAuth secrets typed into the admin UI, which the API refuses to store without it

Optional: PRIME_API_KEY, the Slack and Buzz credentials, and the whole Piggy block — the agent is off unless you turn it on.

PRIME_API_KEY is now one key with two jobs: the API syncs GPU availability from api.primeintellect.ai with it, and Piggy calls models on api.pinference.ai with it. Scope it to Availability → Read plus inference, and nothing that can provision. Piggy still accepts PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY as an alias for the same value, so a host configured before the agent moved onto Prime Inference keeps starting untouched.

Piggy listens on piggy:8931 inside the Compose network. The port is exposed to other containers but never published to the host, and Caddy must not route to it. The CRM API authenticates the user, forwards only bounded chat context, and uses PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN in an Authorization header. Never put that token in a query string, where proxies and access logs can retain it.

3. Start

docker compose -p pig up -d db
docker compose -p pig run --rm --no-deps app pnpm exec tsx packages/db/src/migrate.ts
docker compose -p pig up -d --build app
docker compose -p pig run --rm --no-deps app pnpm exec tsx packages/db/src/seed/index.ts   # optional

Migrate from a one-off container, before the app starts — not with exec. exec needs a running app to attach to, and a release that queries a table its migration has not yet created crash-loops before you can attach to it. You then have a container restarting every few seconds and no way in. run --rm --no-deps uses the same image without the app, and without starting its dependencies twice. This is what commit d4d7095 changed and it is what scripts/deploy.sh does.

That starts the CRM alone: the agent is behind a Compose profile and stays down. To run it, see Turning Piggy on — set the switch in .env rather than starting the container by hand, because a hand-started Piggy is one no later deploy knows to upgrade.

Use -p pig. A compose project that shares a name with a neighbouring stack will adopt its volumes, which is a memorable way to lose a database.

4. Reverse proxy

See Caddyfile.example. Serve the app and API from the same origin.

Two things that will otherwise cost you an hour:

• If other sites on the host use bind <address>, yours must too. Caddy groups site blocks into servers by listen address. A block without bind lands in a separate server on :443, and the more specific listener wins for traffic arriving on that address — which is all public traffic after NAT. The symptom is a valid certificate, a 200 response, an empty body, and none of your headers. It looks like the app is broken; it is that the request never reached it.

• The CSP must carry the hash of the inline theme script in index.html. That script sets light or dark before first paint so dark-mode users do not get a white flash. Editing it changes the hash and CSP will silently block it — the browser console prints the hash it expects.

  That hash exists in three places, and only two of them are checked.

  Copy	Checked by
  .gitea/workflows/ci.yml (the expected constant)	itself, on every run
  deploy/Caddyfile.example	nothing — it is an example
  the live Caddyfile on the host	nothing at all

  The live one is the only copy that decides whether a browser runs the script. Nothing in this repository can see it, CI cannot fail on it, and the failure is a white flash for dark-mode users with no error anywhere. Editing that script means editing all three by hand and reloading Caddy.

5. Verify

curl -s https://primeintellectgrowth.com/api/health
# {"ok":true,"service":"pig","version":"0.1.0"}

Check the public origin, not just 127.0.0.1:8920. The bind failure above answers with a valid certificate, HTTP 200 and an empty body, which satisfies every check that only asks whether something responded. scripts/deploy.sh now asserts the body is non-empty and contains the application's mount point for this reason.

Turning Piggy on

Piggy is the in-app agent, and it is worth knowing what it is before you run it.

It is a Prime Agent session — Prime Intellect's own agent harness, @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent, embedded as a library rather than shelled out to — holding PIG's CRM tools and nothing else. The harness is constructed with every built-in tool disabled (noTools: 'all') and an explicit allowlist on top, so the model has no shell, no filesystem access and no Python. The live tool list is compared against that allowlist when a session starts and a mismatch is a startup error, so a future harness release cannot quietly widen it.

Three things follow for an operator:

• It writes. PIGGY_AGENT_MODE decides how: read_only, confirm (default — a change is proposed as a card and applied when a person clicks) or auto. Contracts, commitments, allocations and compliance records always require a click regardless. Every write runs as the calling user's own principal, so Piggy cannot reach a record its user could not, and the audit trail names the human.
• The model is chosen per conversation, from a five-model picker defined in apps/piggy/src/agent/models.json. PIGGY_AGENT_MODEL is only the default for a user who has not chosen.
• Conversations are persisted in piggy_conversations and piggy_messages (migration 0014), so an agent turn now depends on the schema being current. scripts/deploy.sh migrates from a one-off container before it starts either container, which is what keeps that true.

It is off by default and nothing about it is configurable from the admin UI — every value below is read once, when the container boots.

Three keys in .env, and all three are needed:

PIGGY_ENABLED=true
PRIME_API_KEY=<a Prime Intellect key with inference; PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY
               is still accepted as the legacy alias for the same value>
PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN=<openssl rand -hex 32>

The fourth thing the API needs, PIGGY_INTERNAL_URL, is already set to http://piggy:8931 by docker-compose.yml. Set it in .env only for a Piggy running outside Compose.

Then deploy as usual:

bash scripts/deploy.sh

Do not start the container by hand. The service carries profiles: ['piggy'], and compose skips a profile-gated service silently: without the profile, pull, build and up behave as though it were not in the file, with no warning and a zero exit. deploy.sh reads PIGGY_ENABLED from .env and adds --profile piggy to the pull, the build, the up and the rollback, so the agent moves with the app. A Piggy started once with --profile piggy up -d and then forgotten is not covered by any of that: it keeps running the image of the day it was started, against a schema several migrations newer, which is the failure the comment at the top of docker-compose.yml is about. deploy.sh therefore compares the piggy container's image ID with the release's and rolls back if they differ.

scripts/autodeploy.sh compares both containers' digests for the same reason. Without that, an old Piggy is invisible to the poller: the app matches the newest tag, the poller says "up to date" every five minutes, and the agent runs last month's code indefinitely.

A missing API key crash-loops the worker

PRIME_API_KEY (or its alias PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY) is required by apps/piggy/src/config.ts. Without either the process exits at boot with Invalid Piggy configuration: PRIME_API_KEY ... is required., and restart: unless-stopped starts it again — so the symptom is a container restarting every few seconds, not an error anyone sees in the CRM. PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN shorter than 32 characters fails the same way, and so does a PIGGY_AGENT_MODEL that is not one of the five ids in apps/piggy/src/agent/models.json — rejected at boot on purpose, because the alternative is a model that 404s on a user's first question.

deploy.sh catches all of them: it waits for the container to report healthy and exits 3 if it does not, deliberately without rolling back, because the previous image reads the same .env and would fail identically.

A blank line is not an absent one, and here it is actively misleading. PRIME_API_KEY and PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY are two spellings of one key, and each is declared .min(1).optional(). Compose passes a blank .env line through as the empty string, so a file that sets PRIME_API_KEY correctly and carries a leftover empty PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY= line crash-loops Piggy with:

Invalid Piggy configuration:
  PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY: String must contain at least 1 character(s)

— a message about the key you did not use. Comment the unused spelling out. Before enabling Piggy on an existing host, check for exactly this:

grep -nE '^(PRIME_API_KEY|PIGGY_INFERENCE_API_KEY)=$' /opt/pig/.env

Any line that prints is one to comment out.

The thinking-level trap — read this before changing the model

The single setting most likely to make a working deployment look broken.

The harness defaults thinkingLevel to medium, which is tuned for a coding agent. On the default model that produced 6,195 output tokens of reasoning and an empty answer: the turn hit its token ceiling while still thinking and came back with finish_reason: length. low was worse. off is Piggy's default, and for the nemotron models it maps to the endpoint's reasoning_effort: none — the same question then answered correctly in 149 output tokens.

The mapping is per model and lives in thinkingLevelMap in apps/piggy/src/agent/models.json. The two nemotron entries have one; deepseek, opus and gpt-5.6 do not, and for them off omits reasoning_effort entirely so the endpoint's own default applies.

So if you change PIGGY_AGENT_MODEL and start getting empty answers, truncated answers or a surprising bill, this is where to look — not at the agent, the tools or the network. Give the new model a thinkingLevelMap before raising PIGGY_AGENT_THINKING.

Where the harness is allowed to look at the filesystem

PIGGY_AGENT_DIR is the harness's own directory. docker-compose.yml pins it to /var/lib/piggy-agent, which the image creates owned by the unprivileged node user at mode 0700. Leave it alone.

Two reasons it is not the default ~/.pig/piggy-agent:

• Writability. Under docker run with USER node, ~ resolves to /home/node and works. That is incidental: a runtime that starts this image with a numeric user and no matching passwd entry (runAsUser: 1000 under Kubernetes) leaves HOME unset, os.homedir() falls back to /, and the agent dies creating its directory — on the first turn, long after the deploy reported success.
• Prompt containment. The harness discovers extensions, skills and context files from its cwd, and Piggy hands it this directory as cwd. Point it at the checkout, or bind-mount a repository over it, and source files become reachable from a CRM agent's prompt. Never bind-mount anything here. deploy.sh reads the value back off the running container and refuses to report success if it sits inside /app.

The directory is not persisted, deliberately. Nothing in it is worth keeping across a restart: Piggy rewrites models.json there from the image at every boot, the credential store is in-memory by design, sessions are in-memory, and the conversations live in Postgres. A cold start costs nothing measurable, and a volume would only be a way for a file to outlive the image that wrote it.

Health

The piggy container has its own healthcheck, against the chat server's unauthenticated GET /internal/health:

docker compose -p pig --profile piggy ps
# NAME         STATUS
# pig-piggy-1  Up 2 minutes (healthy)

docker compose -p pig --profile piggy exec piggy \
  node -e "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8931/internal/health').then(r=>r.text()).then(console.log)"
# {"ok":true,"service":"piggy-chat","model":"nvidia/nemotron-3-nano-30b-a3b"}

It needs its own because the image's HEALTHCHECK asks for 127.0.0.1:8920/api/health — the API's port, which this container does not serve. Inherited unchanged, Piggy reported unhealthy for ever while working perfectly.

There is no published port and there must not be one. The listener is reachable only from inside the Compose network, the API authenticates the user before forwarding anything, and the bearer token goes in a header — never a query string, where a proxy or an access log would keep it.

What the image carries for the agent

Two things about the production image are worth knowing before you debug a container that will not start.

models.json is a runtime file, not a compiled-in constant. apps/piggy/src/agent/models.json is read from disk at boot, validated, and copied into the agent directory for the harness to register its provider from. It reaches the image inside COPY apps/piggy, and the Dockerfile parses it during the build so that a narrowed COPY or a new .dockerignore rule fails there rather than at 03:00 in a crash loop.

Production dependencies are installed with --ignore-scripts. The Prime Agent SDK drags in a large transitive tree, including @google/genai and protobufjs; their install scripts — and esbuild's — are denied in pnpm-workspace.yaml on purpose, so nothing a dependency pulls in can execute code at install time. Piggy talks to exactly one provider over an OpenAI-compatible API and none of that tree is on a path it executes. The Dockerfile imports the SDK during the build to prove the scriptless install still yields a loadable agent, and the container has been run end to end against a live key: health, a tool call, and a correct answer.

Tuning

The agent's own settings, all with defaults in apps/piggy/src/config.ts:

Variable	Default	What it does
PIGGY_AGENT_MODEL	nvidia/nemotron-3-nano-30b-a3b	The default answer model. Must be one of the ids in apps/piggy/src/agent/models.json; anything else is refused at boot
PIGGY_AGENT_MODE	confirm	read_only, confirm or auto. Contracts, commitments, allocations and compliance always confirm regardless
PIGGY_AGENT_THINKING	off	See the thinking-level trap before touching it
PIGGY_AGENT_MAX_TOKENS	4096	Output tokens per agent turn, reasoning included. Clamped down to the chosen model's own ceiling
PIGGY_AGENT_DIR	~/.pig/piggy-agent	Pinned to /var/lib/piggy-agent by docker-compose.yml. Do not override under Compose

The pre-agent settings still apply to the queue worker and exist to be lowered: PIGGY_MAX_TOKENS (per queued task), PIGGY_CHAT_MAX_TOKENS (per interactive answer), PIGGY_MAX_TURNS, PIGGY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS, PIGGY_LEASE_SECONDS, PIGGY_REASONING_EFFORT and the two PIGGY_PRICE_*_CENTS_PER_MTOK values that make the cost recorded against each run exact. .env.example lists them commented out, and that is not decoration: an empty PIGGY_MAX_TOKENS= line is passed to the container as the empty string, which coerces to 0 and refuses to start. Leave a key commented to get its default; do not leave it blank.

The database is the only undo for an agent write

Piggy can modify CRM records, so a release that ships a broken write tool can corrupt data no migration ever touched. scripts/deploy.sh dumps the database before it migrates and before the new image starts, to backups/ next to the checkout:

backups/pig-20260814-030201.sql.gz

That directory is in .gitignore, so autodeploy.sh's forced checkout at a release tag leaves it alone. The dump is verified rather than assumed: the script decompresses it and refuses to migrate if a database with tables in it produced less than 4 KB of SQL, because pg_dump | gzip turns silence into a plausible-looking 20-byte file and a deploy log that claims a backup was taken.

Nothing prunes these. They are the only copy — copy them off the host if the data matters as much as the uptime does.

Changing any of them means restarting the container — bash scripts/deploy.sh, or docker compose -p pig --profile piggy up -d piggy if the release is otherwise unchanged.

Learn videos

PIG hosts its own Learn videos. There is no video service to configure, no embed host and — because a native <video> is not an iframe — nothing to add to the proxy's frame-src. The files are covered by default-src 'self'.

Where they live

Host directory	PIG_MEDIA_HOST_DIR, normally /opt/pig/media
Inside the container	/app/media, bind-mounted read-only
Read by the app from	PIG_MEDIA_DIR (compose sets it to /app/media)
Served at	/media/learn/<filename>
From source, no container	PIG_MEDIA_DIR=./media, relative to the repository root

sudo mkdir -p /opt/pig/media
sudo chown "$USER" /opt/pig/media
# then in /opt/pig/.env
#   PIG_MEDIA_HOST_DIR=/opt/pig/media

Create the directory before compose up. Docker creates a missing bind source itself, as an empty directory owned by root — every video then 404s and you cannot copy a file in without sudo.

The mount is read-only. PIG never writes a video: a file arrives by being copied onto the host, so the write path is not reachable over HTTP at all. Deploys do not touch the directory, and neither does a rollback — the videos outlive any particular release.

Naming: content-addressed, and why

A filename is <slug>.<hash>.<ext>, for example pig-tour.7f3a91c2.mp4. Only [A-Za-z0-9._-] is accepted, with mp4, webm or m4v as the extension; anything else is refused both as a stored source and as a file read.

slug=pig-tour
hash=$(sha256sum "$slug.mp4" | cut -c1-8)
mv "$slug.mp4" "$slug.$hash.mp4"

The hash is load-bearing, not decoration:

The media FILES are served unauthenticated. The LISTING is not. Who learns that a video exists — its title, its track, whether it is code-visible at all — is decided by /api/learn and /api/learn/public. The bytes are handed to anyone who can name the file. This is how every video platform works: a gated manifest in front of segments on an open CDN. It is also what a <video> element requires, since a media element re-requests byte ranges on every seek and carries no bearer token while doing it.

What it costs. A URL, once shared, is a permanent public link to that video. Someone given the share code can copy the src out of the page and post it, and rotating the Learn access code does not close it. The remedies are to rename the file (a new hash, therefore a new URL) or delete it. We accept that: these are product demos meant to be shareable with the code. The material that must never leak is the supply and demand concept tracks, and those are gated by the listing — which is where the boundary genuinely is.

What the hash buys. There is no directory index and a wrong guess is a flat 404, so an unguessable name makes the exposure "whoever has the link" rather than "the internet". That is precisely an unlisted video.

Publishing one

cp pig-tour.7f3a91c2.mp4 /opt/pig/media/
pnpm db:demo -- --hosted     # inserts rows for the files that are present

The seed discovers files by slug, so the hash never has to be written into the manifest. It is idempotent — the unique key on (track, provider, external_id) does that work — and it inserts a row only when the file is on disk, because a Learn card whose video 404s reads as a broken product rather than a missing one. Rows for files that have since disappeared are reported, never deleted: deleting them would empty the curriculum the first time someone ran the seed with the media directory unmounted.

pnpm db:demo -- --clear removes the DEMO — rows and leaves these alone. pnpm db:demo -- --clear-hosted removes these and leaves the files on disk.

Checking it

curl -sI https://primeintellectgrowth.com/media/learn/pig-tour.7f3a91c2.mp4
# accept-ranges: bytes          <- without this, the scrubber does nothing
curl -s -r 0-99 -o /dev/null -D - \
  https://primeintellectgrowth.com/media/learn/pig-tour.7f3a91c2.mp4
# HTTP/2 206 ... content-range: bytes 0-99/<size>

A 200 where a 206 is expected means something in front of PIG is buffering the response and dropping the range — the video will play from the start and refuse to seek.

Upgrading

By hand

bash scripts/deploy.sh

It fetches origin/main, starts the database, dumps it and checks the dump is usable, builds, migrates from a one-off container, starts the app — and Piggy, when PIGGY_ENABLED is on — and refuses to call the deploy done until the health endpoint, the unauthenticated-401 gate, the piggy container's image, agent directory and health, and the public origin all agree.

The database is started before the dump rather than after it, which is a recent fix: the dump execs into that container, so on a host where the stack was down — a reboot, a compose down, a first-ever deploy — the backup step failed and took the release with it.

By tag — the normal path

Shipping is two steps and the second one is a human being:

git tag release-2026-08-13 && git push origin release-2026-08-13

That is the entire ship decision. What follows:

1. CI runs the full verify job against the tagged commit — the same job a push to main runs. A tag does not skip verification.
2. Only if that passes, the publish job builds and pushes git.karti.ai/pig/pig:<tag> and :<short-sha> to the Gitea registry.
3. Within five minutes pig-autodeploy.timer on the host notices that the newest release-* tag has a digest different from the running container, checks the tree out at that tag, and runs scripts/deploy.sh with PIG_IMAGE set — so it pulls the published image instead of rebuilding it.

Push to main deploys nothing. Tagging does.

The direction of travel is the point. No credential on the shared CI runner can execute anything on this host; the host holds a pull-only registry token and fetches. That preserves both halves of the constraint written at the top of scripts/deploy.sh — no production key on the runner, and a human still choosing when it ships.

Trap: sudo throws PIG_IMAGE away. The default sudoers policy sets env_reset, so PIG_IMAGE=… sudo docker compose … hands compose an environment without it and compose interpolates the pig:local fallback from docker-compose.yml. The pull then dies with "pull access denied for pig" — and if it had not died, the migrate, the up and the rollback would all have run the stale local image while the log named the release tag. Every compose invocation in deploy.sh therefore goes through the dc() wrapper, which uses sudo env PIG_IMAGE=… COMPOSE_PROFILES=… docker compose …; sudo -E and bare sudo VAR=val are both refused by that same policy. COMPOSE_PROFILES travels the same way and for a sharper reason: dropped, compose does not error, it just leaves Piggy out of whatever you asked for. Anything new that shells out to compose must use the wrapper.

Rollback

scripts/deploy.sh records the image the app container was running before it replaces it. If the health check, the unauthenticated-401 gate, the piggy image assertion or the public-origin marker check fails, it re-tags that image, restarts the app — and Piggy with it, since they are one image running two commands — reports whether the restored version is healthy, and exits non-zero. Previously those exits left the broken release live, which was fine when a human was watching the terminal and an outage when the poller ran at 04:00.

The exit code says what is serving, because that is the one thing the on-call needs at 04:00 and autodeploy.sh can see nothing else:

Exit	Meaning
0	deployed
1	a gate failed and the previous image was restored
3	a gate failed and the release under test is still live

3 covers the cases where a rollback was not attempted (the fault is not attributable to the release), where there was no previous image to restore, and where the restore itself did not come up. autodeploy.sh logs a different sentence for each, so the journal never claims a rollback that did not happen.

Two things it deliberately does not do:

• It does not roll the database back. Migrations are additive, so the previous image runs against the new schema. 0014 is the current example: it creates piggy_conversations and piggy_messages and alters nothing, so an image that predates it never names those tables and cannot notice they exist. That safety is a property of the migrations, not of this script — a migration that drops a column, renames one or tightens a constraint would break the restored image, and the dump taken before the migration is the escape hatch for that.
• It does not roll back when the public origin answers with an EMPTY body. Something terminated TLS and replied, so the fault is the proxy — see bind below — and the previous image would fail the same check. Exit 3.
• It does not roll back when Piggy is enabled but does not come up. Same reasoning: the previous image reads the same .env, so restoring it churns a healthy CRM without fixing the agent. Exit 3, and the log lists the three configuration faults that cause it — a missing or rejected PRIME_API_KEY, a short PIGGY_INTERNAL_TOKEN, a PIGGY_AGENT_MODEL outside the catalogue.
• It does not roll back when PIGGY_AGENT_DIR points inside /app. The container is healthy; the problem is that the harness's cwd would be the application checkout, so repository files could reach a CRM agent's prompt. Restoring the previous image changes nothing — it reads the same compose file — so the script refuses to report success and exits 3.

Those last two are the exit-3 cases where the site itself is fine.

It does roll back when the origin answers with a non-empty body that lacks the marker. A proxy fault cannot serve a wrong-but-populated page for this hostname; a bad release can — a changed Vite base, a Dockerfile step that stopped copying apps/web/dist. Every earlier gate passes in that state, so this is the only one that fires, and refusing to roll back would leave the broken release facing the public.

If curl cannot reach the public origin at all (no hairpin for the public name, egress to 443 filtered), that is not a failed deploy: it is a host that cannot see itself from outside, and blacklisting the digest over it costs a release. The script warns and exits 0. On a host where the public name really is reachable from the host, set PIG_DEPLOY_REQUIRE_PUBLIC=1 to make it fatal (exit 3).

scripts/autodeploy.sh writes the failed digest to /var/lib/pig/failed-release and will not retry it, so one bad tag does not become a five-minute restart loop. Delete that file, or publish a new tag, to try again.

To pin a specific release by hand:

git checkout --detach refs/tags/release-2026-08-12
PIG_IMAGE=git.karti.ai/pig/pig:release-2026-08-12 bash scripts/deploy.sh

Check the tree out at the tag as well as setting PIG_IMAGE. The compose file and the migrations must come from the same commit as the image; with PIG_IMAGE set, deploy.sh deliberately does not touch git, precisely so it cannot drag you back to main behind your back.

Migrations are additive and safe to re-run; Drizzle tracks what has been applied. deploy.sh takes a dump before every deploy; take one by hand before a major upgrade anyway:

docker compose -p pig exec db pg_dump -U pig pig | gzip > pig-$(date +%F).sql.gz

Installing the release poller

Only on the host that serves production, and only once.

# 1. A pull-only credential. read:package scope and NOTHING else — a token here
#    that can write packages or push to the repository undoes the reason
#    deployment is not automated from CI in the first place.
sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/pig
printf '%s' 'gitea-token-here' | sudo tee /etc/pig/registry-token > /dev/null
sudo chmod 0600 /etc/pig/registry-token
sudo chown root:root /etc/pig/registry-token

# 2. Anything the defaults get wrong. Optional; the script assumes
#    /opt/pig, git.karti.ai and pig/pig.
sudo tee /etc/pig/autodeploy.env > /dev/null <<'EOF'
PIG_REGISTRY_USER=pig-deploy
PIG_REPO_DIR=/opt/pig
EOF
sudo chmod 0600 /etc/pig/autodeploy.env

# 3. The units.
sudo cp /opt/pig/deploy/pig-autodeploy.service /etc/systemd/system/
sudo cp /opt/pig/deploy/pig-autodeploy.timer   /etc/systemd/system/
sudo systemctl daemon-reload

# 4. Dry-run it once, in the foreground, before trusting a timer with it.
sudo systemctl start pig-autodeploy.service
sudo journalctl -u pig-autodeploy.service -n 50 --no-pager

# 5. Then arm it.
sudo systemctl enable --now pig-autodeploy.timer
systemctl list-timers pig-autodeploy.timer

The service is Type=oneshot with no Restart=, and the timer is not Persistent=true: a missed poll is caught at the next tick rather than fired at boot, which is when nobody is watching.

Watch a deploy:

journalctl -u pig-autodeploy.service -f

On-premises: using your own identity provider

PIG authenticates against any standards-compliant OIDC provider, which is how an install inside your own network works. Set:

PIG_OIDC_ISSUER=https://id.yourcompany.internal
PIG_OIDC_AUDIENCE=pig          # the client/app id you registered for PIG

That is usually the whole configuration — the JWKS is discovered from the issuer. On an air-gapped network, set PIG_OIDC_JWKS_URI too and no discovery request is made.

PIG_OIDC_ISSUER takes precedence over SUPABASE_URL, so the hosted values can stay in the environment file without quietly taking over.

Set the audience. Without it, any token your provider issued for any application in the same tenant verifies here — a token minted for an unrelated internal tool would be accepted as a PIG session. PIG warns about this at boot but cannot refuse, because some providers legitimately issue single-audience tokens.

Provisioning stays in PIG. Authenticating proves who someone is; it does not make them a member. They still need an invite, and their team and role live in PIG's database. That is deliberate — your directory should not have to model "supply lead versus demand member" for one application.

A note on the auth project

PIG verifies JWTs but authorizes from its own users table. If the Supabase project is shared with another application, its users get nothing here until they are explicitly invited. That is deliberate, and it is why a valid token can still return 403 needs_profile.