13dec6b4b8
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
117 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
117 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
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import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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import type { Database } from '@pig/db';
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import { accounts, activities, agentTasks } from '@pig/db';
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import { AuthError } from '../src/lib/auth';
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import { executeMutation, MutationError } from '../src/lib/mutation';
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import {
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accountSupportsTeam,
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createAccountMutationDefinition,
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createDemandDealMutationDefinition,
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} from '../src/routes/records';
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import { principal } from './helpers/principal';
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const demandPrincipal = principal();
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describe('record-side decisions', () => {
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it('makes dual-side accounts available to both commercial teams', () => {
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assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'demand'), true);
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assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'supply'), true);
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assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('both', 'research'), false);
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assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('supply', 'demand'), false);
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assert.equal(accountSupportsTeam('demand', 'supply'), false);
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});
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it('does not let a demand writer create a supply-only account', async () => {
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const db = {
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transaction: async (work: (tx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => work({}),
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} as unknown as Database;
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await assert.rejects(
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executeMutation(
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db,
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demandPrincipal,
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async () => ({
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name: 'Supply only',
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side: 'supply',
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}),
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createAccountMutationDefinition(),
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),
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(error: unknown) =>
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error instanceof AuthError && error.code === 'insufficient_permission',
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);
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});
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});
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describe('record mutation evidence and relationships', () => {
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it('queues enrichment and writes the audit event in the account transaction', async () => {
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const events: string[] = [];
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const created = {
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id: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
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name: 'Customer',
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side: 'demand',
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};
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const tx = {
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insert: (table: unknown) => ({
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values: (row: unknown) => {
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events.push(
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table === accounts ? 'account' : table === agentTasks ? 'agent-task' : table === activities ? 'activity' : 'unknown',
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);
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return { returning: async () => [created], row };
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},
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}),
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};
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const db = {
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transaction: async (work: (transaction: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => {
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events.push('begin');
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const result = await work(tx);
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events.push('commit');
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return result;
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},
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} as unknown as Database;
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await executeMutation(
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db,
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demandPrincipal,
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async () => ({ name: 'Customer', side: 'demand' }),
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createAccountMutationDefinition(),
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);
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assert.deepEqual(events, ['begin', 'account', 'agent-task', 'activity', 'commit']);
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});
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it('rejects a demand deal attached to a supply-only account', async () => {
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const tx = {
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select: () => ({
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from: () => ({
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where: () => ({
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limit: async () => [{ id: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001', side: 'supply' }],
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}),
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}),
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}),
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};
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const db = {
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transaction: async (work: (transaction: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => work(tx),
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} as unknown as Database;
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await assert.rejects(
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executeMutation(
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db,
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demandPrincipal,
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async () => ({
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accountId: '10000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
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name: 'Impossible relationship',
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productLine: 'compute_reserved',
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stage: 'qualification',
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currency: 'USD',
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msaExecuted: false,
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dpaExecuted: false,
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}),
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createDemandDealMutationDefinition(),
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),
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(error: unknown) =>
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error instanceof MutationError && error.code === 'relationship_mismatch',
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);
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});
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});
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