Governed compute for unified-memory AI hardware — the machines where CPU and GPU share one pool and there is no separate VRAM allocation to bounce off. Over-commit that pool and the box thrashes and wedges, SSH and ping included, before the OOM killer gets a turn. Compute does not run inference. It supervises the servers that do: - Admission control against two ceilings: a declared budget, and what the machine actually has free. The refusal is the feature. - A 1 Hz watchdog on MemAvailable that stops the newest model before thrash, and defers to a Scene transition rather than racing it. - Scenes: named sets of models activated as one transactional unit, with pre-flight validation and rollback to the previously active Scene on failure. Scenes reference model ids, never weight paths or commands, so a Scene obtained from elsewhere cannot introduce code. - Process ownership bound to (boot_id, pid, start_time_ticks, pgid == pid), so a reused PID can never be group-killed. - A protocol-transparent TCP gateway, so clients keep one address while model runtimes move behind it. - An MCP server, so agents drive the node as tools rather than as a CLI. One binary, no async runtime outside the MCP surface. Apache-2.0. Generated from the internal monorepo by scripts/publish-compute.sh, which refuses to publish a tree it cannot prove clean.
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# Security policy
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Please report vulnerabilities privately to the maintainers before opening a
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public issue.
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Lumbridge Compute treats model registries as trusted local configuration and scenes/eval suites
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as potentially untrusted shared data. Shared manifests reference vetted ids and
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must never execute embedded shell commands. Downloads must be checksum-verified
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before promotion into the trusted registry. Secrets belong in environment or
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OS-managed secret stores, never manifests, logs, or result artifacts.
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