# Research map The working checkouts live outside this repository at: ```text Desktop/Lumbridge Code/Research/ ``` They are shallow snapshots for study, not dependencies or vendored source. ## Multiplexers and terminal engines - `manaflow-ai/cmux`: the current cmux product; native workspace/pane model, automation socket, embedded browser, agent hooks, and terminal UX. - `Helvesec/rmux`: Rust multiplexer engine, daemon, typed SDKs, tmux surface. - `tmux/tmux`: the durable client/server and command model to remain compatible with where useful. - `zellij-org/zellij`: Rust workspace, layouts, plugins, collaboration, web client. - `wez/wezterm`: mature Rust terminal emulator, multiplexer, rendering, and PTY portability reference. ## Agent IDEs and orchestration products - `stablyai/orca`: parallel worktrees, many harnesses, terminals, usage tracking, remote execution, and review surfaces. - `get-bb/bb`: self-drivable agent IDE with desktop, web, CLI, and API surfaces. - `coder/xum`: isolated parallel agent workspaces, remote execution, review, and cost/context UX; AGPL, so treat implementation as study-only. - `zed-industries/zed`: high-performance Rust editor, GPUI, terminal, and ACP client. Review the dual-license boundary file by file. - `aaif-goose/goose`: Rust desktop/CLI/API agent, many providers, MCP, and ACP. - `block/buzz`: Rust human/agent collaboration plus production ACP harness design. - `bbarit/terminal`: Rust agent terminal/IDE ideas. No top-level license file was present in the captured snapshot, so do not reuse implementation code. ## Protocols - `agentclientprotocol/agent-client-protocol`: canonical ACP schema and spec. - `agentclientprotocol/rust-sdk`: official high-level Rust client/agent runtime. ## Harnesses - `openai/codex` - `deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness` - `google-gemini/gemini-cli` - `badlogic/pi-mono` - `NousResearch/hermes-agent` - `openclaw/openclaw` - `anomalyco/opencode` DeepSeek Harness at the captured revision is MIT-licensed experimental software, but it is a large Node/TypeScript workspace with a React web client, Cordis plugin tree, native/platform payloads, and a broad third-party closure. Its own safety notice says it is unaudited and can access processes, files, credentials, and the network exposed to it. We will study its service seams, durable event log, approval flow, ACP profile, and agent lifecycle. We will not embed its web shell into Lumbridge or treat its sandbox as a security boundary. Any branded fork is a separate repository/process with preserved notices and an explicit dependency and payload review. ## Research questions 1. Which terminal core gives us correctness without inheriting a product-shaped dependency or incompatible license? 2. Can the runtime maintain smooth human input while agents read/write other panes through automation? 3. Which UI stack meets latency, IME, accessibility, and packaging requirements? 4. What is the smallest honest common denominator across ACP harnesses? 5. Which official provider/harness surfaces expose subscription quota, and what must remain measured or unavailable? 6. Can one event model cover PTY, ACP, Git, usage, permissions, and recovery without turning into untyped JSON everywhere?