Add ROADMAP; settle ADR 0005 with a measured OCI port test

cloud-1 (phx) and cloud-2 (us-sanjose-1) are both already OCI aarch64
instances, so the open question in ADR 0005 was answerable directly rather
than by reading forum posts. Measured from cloud-2:

  BLOCKED  25    gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, aspmx.l.google.com
  OPEN     587/465/2525  gmail, sendgrid, SES, OCI Email Delivery

The community reports claiming 587 and 2525 are also blocked are wrong.
Only 25 is blocked, exactly as Oracle documents, so relay works and the
launch host is viable. Inbound :25 reachability is still unverified — that
is a VCN security-list change, not a platform limit.

ROADMAP.md carries the goal, three success signals that are deliberately
not v0.1, a definition-of-ready checklist, and five standing rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JkyvfNJGTshJNE9FtwPLk7

ROADMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# OpenMail — goal and roadmap
+
+## The goal
+
+**Be the mail server agents run on.** Self-hosted, Apache-2.0, agent-native —
+the option an enterprise can point MX at without trusting us, and a builder can
+build a commercial product on without asking us.
+
+Not a hosted product. Not open-core. See
+[`docs/adr/0006-self-hosted-first.md`](docs/adr/0006-self-hosted-first.md).
+
+### How we'll know it worked
+
+| | Signal |
+|---|---|
+| **Technically** | An agent creates its own inbox, receives real mail from Gmail, and replies — with the reply landing in the inbox, not spam — with no human in the loop. |
+| **In the ecosystem** | `mail-dane` and `mail-mta-sts` are depended on by a Rust project that is not ours. |
+| **Commercially** | One business we did not talk into it is running OpenMail on their own infrastructure, on their own domain. |
+
+None of those are v0.1. They are what v0.1 is aimed at.
+
+---
+
+## Definition of ready: what "ready to build" means
+
+The scaffold is done. This is the checklist that says the *foundation* is
+finished and feature work can start without stopping to fix plumbing.
+
+- [x] Apache-2.0, `NOTICE`, licence policy enforced in CI (`cargo-deny`)
+- [x] 12-crate workspace; `check`/`test`/`clippy`/`fmt` green on x86_64 and aarch64
+- [x] `unsafe_code = "forbid"` workspace-wide
+- [x] Postgres schema as an embedded migration
+- [x] Six decisions recorded as ADRs, each with its cost stated
+- [x] Multi-stage Dockerfile, non-root, no shell in the runtime image
+- [x] **OCI outbound port block measured, not assumed** — 25 blocked, 587/465/2525 open
+- [ ] Repo pushed to `karti-ai/openmail`
+- [ ] CI actually running (GitHub-hosted x86 + spark-1 aarch64 runner)
+- [ ] `openmail.karti.ai` live
+- [ ] `cargo publish --dry-run` clean on the three tier-1 crates
+
+---
+
+## v0.1 — the agent layer, provable without mail
+
+**Thesis to prove:** the agent-native model is worth having, independent of
+whether we can move mail yet. Everything here is testable in CI with no mail
+infrastructure at all.
+
+- [ ] `openmail-core::extract::strip_quoted` — the first real algorithm. Prefer
+      under-stripping to over-stripping; losing new content is unrecoverable,
+      keeping a few quoted lines only costs tokens.
+- [ ] `openmail-core::thread` — both bases (`Headers`, `SubjectHeuristic`) with
+      the time window that bounds the wrong answer
+- [ ] `openmail-store` — inbox/message/thread queries, S3 blob client
+- [ ] `openmail-api` — the v0 handlers behind bearer auth
+- [ ] **`POST /v0/inboxes/{id}/ingest`** — the loop-closer. Feed it a raw
+      `.eml`, get back a threaded, extracted message. This is the milestone.
+- [ ] A corpus of ugly real-world `.eml` fixtures. Not synthetic — Outlook,
+      Gmail, mobile clients, and at least one message that is legally MIME and
+      practically deranged.
+
+**Done when:** `docker compose up`, POST a real message, get correct threading
+and clean `extracted_text` back.
+
+## v0.2 — receive
+
+- [ ] `openmail-smtpd` on :25 with `Limits` enforced and a timeout on every state
+- [ ] `openmail-guard` — iprev, DNSBL, rate limit, in that order (never spend a
+      DNS round trip on a connection a counter can reject)
+- [ ] `mail-auth` SPF/DKIM/DMARC verdicts recorded per message
+- [ ] `openmail-junk` per-inbox scoring
+- [ ] `message.received` webhooks + WebSocket
+- [ ] Real MX for a test domain; open OCI inbound :25 and prove mail arrives
+
+## v0.3 — send, and the surface agents actually use
+
+- [ ] Relay send via **both** SES and Oracle from the start — two providers is
+      what forces the abstraction to stay data-driven
+- [ ] Local DKIM signing
+- [ ] `mail-dsn` bounce handling wired to `outbox` state
+- [ ] `openmail-mcp` served — an agent creates an inbox, receives, and replies,
+      with no human involved
+
+## v0.4 — direct-to-MX, and the crates ship
+
+- [ ] `mail-dane` complete — DNSSEC-validated TLSA, and the property that an
+      unauthenticated set can never return `Match`
+- [ ] `mail-mta-sts` complete — policy cache where a fetch failure never evicts
+      a valid policy
+- [ ] **Publish both to crates.io.** First permissive implementations in Rust.
+- [ ] Direct MX delivery with both enforced. Not on OCI — that host blocks :25.
+- [ ] IP warmup, FBL enrolment, suppression lists
+
+## v1.0
+
+- [ ] IMAP front-end so a human uses their own client against the same mailbox
+- [ ] Multi-tenancy beyond `pods`
+- [ ] A deliverability track record worth publishing
+
+---
+
+## Standing rules
+
+1. **Never copy from an AGPL/GPL tree.** Stalwart's server, maddy, BillionMail
+   are read-only reference. Work from RFCs. ADR 0003.
+2. **Silent failures are the highest-severity class.** A DANE downgrade or a
+   mis-cached MTA-STS policy does not error — it quietly removes a security
+   property or defers mail nobody sees. Every outcome in those crates is an
+   explicit enum with no `Default` and no `bool`.
+3. **Measure, don't assume.** The OCI port block was a documented "fact" that
+   community reports contradicted; ten minutes of testing settled it. Do that
+   every time.
+4. **`pods` is not dead code.** It is the only thing keeping a future hosted
+   offering migration-free.
+5. **Zero clippy warnings is the gate**, not an aspiration.

docs/adr/0005-oracle-cloud.md

@@ -34,11 +34,34 @@ Direct-to-MX (v0.4) is developed and tested on a host without the block.
   against a mechanism the provider does not honour and mail still fails SPF —
   silently. Same for Resend.
 
-## ⚠️ Open — verify before committing to the host
+## Measured, 2026-09-02 — the block is port 25 only
 
-Oracle's docs name only port 25. Mailcow community reports claim **587 and 2525
-are also blocked outbound on free tier**, which would make OCI unable to relay
-either, and would change the host choice entirely.
+Community reports claimed 587 and 2525 were also blocked, which would have made
+OCI unable to relay and changed the host choice entirely. Tested directly from
+our own OCI instance (cloud-2, `us-sanjose-1`, aarch64):
 
-**Test on a free instance before building on this.** It is a 20-minute check
-and it invalidates this ADR if the reports are right.
+```
+BLOCKED  25    gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
+BLOCKED  25    aspmx.l.google.com
+OPEN     587   smtp.gmail.com
+OPEN     465   smtp.gmail.com
+OPEN     587   smtp.sendgrid.net
+OPEN     2525  smtp.sendgrid.net
+OPEN     587   email-smtp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
+OPEN     587   smtp.email.us-sanjose-1.oci.oraclecloud.com
+```
+
+**The reports are wrong.** Only 25 is blocked, exactly as Oracle documents.
+Submission ports are open, including both relay providers we ship. The host is
+viable and this ADR stands.
+
+Note that cloud-1 (`phx`) and cloud-2 (`us-sanjose-1`) are both already OCI
+aarch64 instances — the same shape as the launch target, and the same
+architecture spark-1 builds for.
+
+### Still unverified
+
+**Inbound :25 reachability** has not been tested end-to-end. Oracle blocks
+outbound only, but the VCN security list and the instance firewall must still
+be opened before mail can arrive. That is a configuration change, not a
+platform limit.