13dec6b4b8
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
87 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
import type { HubSpotObjectType } from '../integrations/hubspot/contracts';
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import { HUBSPOT_OBJECT_TYPES } from '../integrations/hubspot/contracts';
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import { HubSpotOAuthError } from '../integrations/hubspot/oauth';
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import { Hono } from 'hono';
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import { requireAnyTeamCapability, requireCapability } from '../lib/auth';
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import type { ApiEnv } from '../lib/mutation';
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const connectionParamSchema = z.string().uuid();
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export interface HubSpotConnectionSummary {
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id: string;
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portalId: string;
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displayName: string | null;
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status: string;
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grantedScopes: readonly string[];
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accessTokenExpiresAt: Date;
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installedAt: Date;
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lastSyncAt: Date | null;
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lastError: string | null;
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}
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export interface HubSpotRouteService {
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begin(requestedByUserId: string): Promise<{ authorizationUrl: string }>;
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complete(code: string, state: string, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<{ returnPath: string }>;
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listConnections(): Promise<readonly HubSpotConnectionSummary[]>;
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enqueueSync(connectionId: string, objectTypes: readonly HubSpotObjectType[], requestedByUserId: string): Promise<{ jobIds: string[] }>;
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}
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export function createHubSpotRoutes(service: HubSpotRouteService): Hono<ApiEnv> {
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const routes = new Hono<ApiEnv>();
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routes.post('/api/integrations/hubspot/oauth/start', async (context) => {
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const principal = context.get('principal');
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requireCapability(principal, 'settings:admin');
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return context.json(await service.begin(principal.userId));
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});
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routes.get('/api/integrations/hubspot/oauth/callback', async (context) => {
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const code = context.req.query('code');
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const state = context.req.query('state');
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if (!code || !state) {
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return context.json({ error: 'HubSpot did not return an authorization code and state.' }, 400);
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}
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try {
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const completed = await service.complete(code, state, context.req.raw.signal);
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return context.redirect(completed.returnPath, 303);
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} catch (error) {
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if (error instanceof HubSpotOAuthError) {
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return context.json({ error: error.message }, 400);
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}
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throw error;
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}
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});
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routes.get('/api/integrations/hubspot/connections', async (context) => {
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if (!context.get('principal').scopes.includes('read')) {
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return context.json({ error: "This credential lacks the 'read' scope." }, 403);
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}
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const connections = await service.listConnections();
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return context.json({
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connections: connections.map((connection) => ({
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...connection,
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accessTokenExpiresAt: connection.accessTokenExpiresAt.toISOString(),
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installedAt: connection.installedAt.toISOString(),
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lastSyncAt: connection.lastSyncAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
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})),
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});
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});
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routes.post('/api/integrations/hubspot/connections/:connectionId/sync', async (context) => {
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const principal = context.get('principal');
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// Any team, and honestly so: a HubSpot sync pulls companies, contacts and
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// deals from both sides at once, so there is no single team to scope it to.
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// Narrowing it would need the sync to accept an object-type filter first.
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requireAnyTeamCapability(principal, 'data:import');
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const parsedId = connectionParamSchema.safeParse(context.req.param('connectionId'));
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if (!parsedId.success) return context.json({ error: 'Invalid HubSpot connection ID.' }, 400);
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return context.json(
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await service.enqueueSync(parsedId.data, HUBSPOT_OBJECT_TYPES, principal.userId),
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202,
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);
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});
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return routes;
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}
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