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Rebuild the shell, add Calendar and Learn, and govern reads
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things
worth knowing before reading the diff:

RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is
stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago.
So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one
is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated
member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull
per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and
every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business,
that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read,
a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member.

THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen.
Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled
against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment
creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply.

POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability
check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect.
It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write.

The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account
switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to
the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its
bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on,
and gains the sidebar as a sheet.

Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table,
because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and
commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the
whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts,
which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be
alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere.

Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be
opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped
learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal
and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing
check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible"
is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts
a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and
/api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without.

CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a
release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can
execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both
halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the
host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a
public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`,
without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local.

Tests 141 -> 261.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 15:02:48 -07:00

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Markdown

# Connecting an agent
PIG is a first-class application for agents. The same MCP server serves every
client, so nobody is asked to use a different tool than the one they already
work in.
This page is about connecting *your* agent to PIG. **Piggy**, the agent that
lives inside PIG, is a different thing and is documented in the README — it
drains a database queue and, in chat, reads and cites records for whoever is
looking at the page.
## Transport, and what that means for you
The MCP server speaks **stdio only**. There is no Streamable HTTP transport and
no `/mcp` endpoint on the API, so each person runs their own copy locally
against their own API key rather than pointing a client at a shared URL. That is
a real limitation, not a security posture — see the build plan.
`@pig/mcp` is a workspace package and is **not published to npm**, so `npx
@pig/mcp` does not work. Run it out of a clone.
## Setup
Create an API key in PIG under **Settings → API keys** — the plaintext is shown
once — then:
```bash
export PIG_URL=https://primeintellectgrowth.com
export PIG_API_KEY=pig_...
```
Scope the key to `read` unless the agent genuinely needs to write. An agent
acting for you is a **separate principal** from you: it has its own audit trail
and can be revoked without disturbing your session, and it can never reach
further than you can — on a write, the key's `write` scope is checked first and
then your own capability for that team.
⚠️ **Reads are not yet gated.** The read policy exists and is tested but is not
mounted in `app.ts`, so a `read`-scoped key currently reaches every GET in the
product, including supplier cost and margin. Treat any key you mint as
cost-visible until that lands.
## What connects
| Client | How |
|---|---|
| **Claude Code** | `claude mcp add pig -- pnpm --dir /path/to/pig exec tsx apps/mcp/src/stdio.ts` |
| **Codex** | Add the same command as an MCP server in its config, with the same two environment variables |
| **prime-agent** | It is an MCP *client*; register the same stdio command |
| **Buzz** | Agents reach PIG through the ACP bridge's MCP support |
## CLI
The `pig` CLI is the HTTP API surface for scripts and Prime Agent kernels. It
never receives database credentials and has no arbitrary-request, shell, or
filesystem command. Configure it separately from the MCP process:
```bash
export PIG_API_URL=https://primeintellectgrowth.com
export PIG_API_KEY=pig_...
pnpm run pig -- me
pnpm run pig -- --json capacity idle --threshold 0.2
pnpm run pig -- --json capacity search --gpu-type H100_80GB --min-gpu-count 8
```
`--api-url` and `--api-key` override the environment for one invocation. In
`--json` mode success writes one JSON value to stdout, while failures write one
JSON error to stderr and exit non-zero. The key is sent only as a bearer token
and is redacted if an upstream error happens to echo it.
## The tools
| Tool | What it answers |
|---|---|
| `pig_whoami` | Who am I acting for, and which teams am I on? |
| `pig_my_pipeline` | Where are we? What needs attention? |
| `pig_capacity_match` | What have we bought that would serve this customer? |
| `pig_margin_report` | What is each block earning against what it cost? |
| `pig_idle_capacity` | What are we paying for and not selling? |
| `pig_inventory_search` | What could we buy to cover demand we cannot serve? |
| `pig_search` | Find an account |
| `pig_get_account` | Everything about one account |
| `pig_log_activity` | Record a call, meeting or note |
`pig_capacity_match` is the one worth learning. Ask it in plain language:
> "A customer wants 128 H100s with InfiniBand for three months, ceiling $2.80
> per GPU-hour. What have we got?"
It returns ranked matches, preferring blocks that are sitting idle — those
hours are already paid for — and warns explicitly when a match would sell below
break-even.
## Why the surface is small
Nine tools, each doing one thing. A sprawling tool list measurably degrades
model performance, and anything genuinely niche is reachable through
`pig_search` or the HTTP API. If you need something that is not here, it is
probably better added as a service method than as a tenth tool.
## What it cannot do
The MCP server holds an API key and calls the same HTTP API a browser does. It
has no database credentials and no privileged path. There is deliberately no
tool that provisions infrastructure, spends money, or emails a customer.