13dec6b4b8
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
101 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
101 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
|
|
import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
|
|
import { z } from 'zod';
|
|
import { AuthError } from '../src/lib/auth';
|
|
import { apiError, executeMutation, MutationError } from '../src/lib/mutation';
|
|
import { fakeDatabase, onTeam, principal as makePrincipal } from './helpers/principal';
|
|
|
|
const principal = makePrincipal();
|
|
|
|
function db(events: string[], inserted: unknown[] = []) {
|
|
return fakeDatabase({ events, inserted });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe('mutation convention', () => {
|
|
it('checks capability before reading attacker-controlled input', async () => {
|
|
const events: string[] = [];
|
|
const forbidden = makePrincipal(onTeam('supply', 'admin'));
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
executeMutation(db(events), forbidden, async () => {
|
|
events.push('body');
|
|
return {};
|
|
}, {
|
|
schema: z.object({ name: z.string() }),
|
|
permission: { capability: 'deal:write', team: 'demand' },
|
|
invalidMessage: 'Invalid deal.',
|
|
async mutate() {
|
|
events.push('mutate');
|
|
return { data: {}, activity: { type: 'note', subject: 'Changed' } };
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
(error: unknown) => error instanceof AuthError && error.code === 'insufficient_permission',
|
|
);
|
|
assert.deepEqual(events, []);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('rejects invalid ontology input before opening a transaction', async () => {
|
|
const events: string[] = [];
|
|
const stages = ['qualification', 'legal'] as const;
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
executeMutation(db(events), principal, async () => ({ stage: 'invented' }), {
|
|
schema: z.object({ stage: z.enum(stages) }),
|
|
permission: { capability: 'deal:write', team: 'demand' },
|
|
invalidMessage: 'Invalid transition.',
|
|
async mutate() {
|
|
events.push('mutate');
|
|
return { data: {}, activity: { type: 'stage_change', subject: 'Changed' } };
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
(error: unknown) =>
|
|
error instanceof MutationError &&
|
|
error.code === 'invalid_request' &&
|
|
apiError(error.code, error.message, error.issues).issues?.length === 1,
|
|
);
|
|
assert.deepEqual(events, []);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('writes mutation evidence in the same transaction with framework attribution', async () => {
|
|
const events: string[] = [];
|
|
const rows: unknown[] = [];
|
|
const result = await executeMutation(
|
|
db(events, rows),
|
|
principal,
|
|
async () => ({ stage: 'legal' }),
|
|
{
|
|
schema: z.object({ stage: z.literal('legal') }),
|
|
permission: { capability: 'deal:write', team: 'demand' },
|
|
invalidMessage: 'Invalid transition.',
|
|
async mutate() {
|
|
events.push('mutate');
|
|
const data = { id: 'deal-1' };
|
|
return {
|
|
data,
|
|
activity: {
|
|
type: 'stage_change',
|
|
subject: 'Moved to legal',
|
|
demandDealId: data.id,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert.deepEqual(result, { id: 'deal-1' });
|
|
assert.deepEqual(events, ['transaction', 'mutate', 'insert']);
|
|
assert.deepEqual(rows, [
|
|
{
|
|
type: 'stage_change',
|
|
subject: 'Moved to legal',
|
|
demandDealId: 'deal-1',
|
|
actorUserId: principal.userId,
|
|
actorAgent: null,
|
|
source: 'manual',
|
|
occurredAt: (rows[0] as { occurredAt: Date }).occurredAt,
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
assert.ok((rows[0] as { occurredAt: unknown }).occurredAt instanceof Date);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|