13dec6b4b8
Seven parallel agents and an adversarial verification pass. The three things worth knowing before reading the diff: RBAC WAS ALREADY BUILT. docs/build-plan.md marks F2 and F3 outstanding and is stale — packages/core/src/permissions.ts and lib/mutation.ts shipped long ago. So this does not rebuild them; it closes the gaps an audit found. The big one is that reads were entirely ungoverned: every GET was "any authenticated member", so a junior demand rep and a research contractor could both pull per-block supplier cost and break-even prices from /api/capacity/margin, and every contract's negotiated terms. For a company whose margin is the business, that was the hole that mattered. Adds book:read / economics:read / team:read, a readGuard middleware, and a `viewer` role below member. THE BUTTON AND THE 403 DISAGREED — the exact thing F3 said must never happen. Contracts.tsx never called can() at all, so its save button was always enabled against a server requiring contract:sign; Capacity.tsx gated commitment creation on deal:write/demand while the server wanted commitment:write/supply. POST /api/activities was the one write bypassing executeMutation: no capability check, and any member could mutate accounts.lastActivityAt as a side effect. It is now a proper mutation() behind activity:write. The shell becomes three panes — a collapsible shadcn sidebar with an account switcher on the Piggy accent, a header with real search, and Piggy docked to the right, page-aware and persistent across navigation. The phone keeps its bottom tab bar, which is the thing this product already beat trycompai/crm on, and gains the sidebar as a sheet. Calendar is a projection over thirteen dated sources rather than a new table, because a table would duplicate dates that already live on contracts, deals and commitments and would drift — and one ledger answering the question is the whole argument. It surfaces export_authorizations and compliance_artifacts, which had indexed expires_at columns, schema comments saying they must be alerted on, and no read endpoint or UI anywhere. Learn carries two tracks. Concepts are members-only; the platform track can be opened with a share code by someone with no account. The code mints a scoped learn-only token and never a Principal — every route here resolves a principal and then checks capabilities, so a principal-minting code would be one missing check away from leaking the book. "Only platform-track rows may be code-visible" is a database CHECK constraint as well as a write-path rule, and a test asserts a valid learn token still gets 401 on /api/dashboard, /api/accounts and /api/contracts — the same invariant scripts/deploy.sh refuses to ship without. CD becomes tag-to-ship. CI publishes an image to the Gitea registry on a release-* tag and cloud-2 pulls it, so no credential on the shared runner can execute anything on production — by construction rather than by policy. Both halves of deploy.sh's original rule survive: nothing on the runner reaches the host, and a human still decides when it ships. deploy.sh gains a rollback and a public-origin check, and PIG_IMAGE now reaches compose through `sudo env`, without which sudo's env_reset silently resolved every release to pig:local. Tests 141 -> 261. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
168 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript
168 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The write that used to bypass everything.
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*
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* `POST /api/activities` lived inline in app.ts with no capability check at
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* all: any member, and any write-scoped API key, could insert an activity
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* against an arbitrary `accountId` and move that account's `lastActivityAt`.
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* These pin the three things that stopped it, not the SQL that carries them
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* out.
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*/
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import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
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import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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import type { Database } from '@pig/db';
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import { AuthError } from '../src/lib/auth';
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import { executeMutation } from '../src/lib/mutation';
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import { createActivityMutationDefinition, type LoggedActivity } from '../src/routes/activities';
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import { onTeam, principal } from './helpers/principal';
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interface Recorded {
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events: string[];
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inserted: unknown[];
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updated: unknown[];
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}
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/** A transaction whose account lookup answers with a chosen side. */
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function database(accountSide: string | null): { db: Database; log: Recorded } {
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const log: Recorded = { events: [], inserted: [], updated: [] };
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const accountRows = accountSide ? [{ side: accountSide }] : [];
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const tx = {
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select: () => {
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log.events.push('select');
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return { from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => accountRows }) }) };
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},
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insert: () => ({
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values: (row: unknown) => {
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log.events.push('insert');
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log.inserted.push(row);
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return { onConflictDoNothing: () => ({ returning: async () => [row] }) };
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},
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}),
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update: () => ({
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set: (values: unknown) => ({
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where: async () => {
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log.events.push('touch-account');
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log.updated.push(values);
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},
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}),
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}),
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};
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return {
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db: {
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transaction: async (work: (t: unknown) => Promise<unknown>) => {
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log.events.push('transaction');
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return work(tx);
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},
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} as unknown as Database,
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log,
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};
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}
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const body = {
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type: 'call' as const,
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subject: 'Spoke to the CTO',
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accountId: '00000000-0000-4000-8000-0000000000ff',
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};
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function log(db: Database, actor = principal()) {
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return executeMutation(
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db,
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actor,
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async () => body,
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createActivityMutationDefinition(),
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) as Promise<LoggedActivity>;
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}
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describe('logging an activity', () => {
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it('refuses a principal with no activity:write anywhere, before reading the body', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('demand');
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let bodyWasRead = false;
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await assert.rejects(
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executeMutation(
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db,
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principal(onTeam('demand', 'viewer')),
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async () => {
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bodyWasRead = true;
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return body;
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},
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createActivityMutationDefinition(),
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),
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(error: unknown) => error instanceof AuthError && error.code === 'insufficient_permission',
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);
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assert.equal(bodyWasRead, false);
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assert.deepEqual(recorded.events, []);
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});
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/**
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* The escalation the old handler allowed: a research member logging a call
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* against a demand account they have no relationship with, and pushing it to
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* the top of somebody else's account list.
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*/
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it('refuses a research member writing against a demand account', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('demand');
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await assert.rejects(
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log(db, principal(onTeam('research', 'admin'))),
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(error: unknown) => error instanceof AuthError && error.code === 'insufficient_permission',
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);
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assert.equal(recorded.inserted.length, 0);
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assert.equal(recorded.updated.length, 0);
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});
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it('admits a demand member against a dual-sided account', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('both');
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const result = await log(db);
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assert.equal(result.deduplicated, false);
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assert.deepEqual(recorded.events, ['transaction', 'select', 'insert', 'touch-account']);
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});
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it('writes one row, not two — the activity is its own audit event', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('demand');
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await log(db);
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assert.equal(
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recorded.inserted.length,
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1,
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'an audit row alongside the activity would double every synced call in the feed',
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);
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});
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it('attributes an API key to the agent, not silently to the person', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('demand');
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await log(db, principal({ via: 'api_key', apiKeyId: 'key-1' }));
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assert.deepEqual(
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recorded.inserted[0] as Record<string, unknown>,
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{
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...(recorded.inserted[0] as Record<string, unknown>),
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actorAgent: 'agent',
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source: 'agent',
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},
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);
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});
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it('keeps the caller\'s timestamp, because sync backfills', async () => {
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const { db, log: recorded } = database('demand');
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const when = '2026-01-05T09:30:00.000Z';
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await executeMutation(
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db,
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principal(),
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async () => ({ ...body, occurredAt: when }),
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createActivityMutationDefinition(),
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);
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const row = recorded.inserted[0] as { occurredAt: Date };
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assert.equal(row.occurredAt.toISOString(), when);
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// And the account stamp follows the event, not the clock, or a backfilled
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// call from March would jump the account to the top of the list today.
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assert.deepEqual(recorded.updated, [{ lastActivityAt: new Date(when) }]);
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});
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});
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