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lumbridge-code/docs/decisions/0022-settings-layering-and-write-authority.md
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Metal AgentandClaude Opus 5 e5d7a3efd5 Add layered settings, and fix a migration mechanism that silently lied
Two things, because the second could not be built on the first.

The schema stamp was part of the same execute_batch as the CREATE TABLE IF NOT
EXISTS statements, and it wrote unconditionally. Opening an older file therefore
added no columns but flipped the version forward anyway; opening a *newer* file
stamped it back down and then wrote rows the newer build could not read. Both
produced a database whose recorded version was a lie, and every future schema
change would have inherited it.

Now the version is read before anything is applied, migrations are ordered and
forward-only inside one transaction, a newer file is refused with SchemaTooNew
rather than downgraded, and a supported version raised without a step to reach
it fails at the first open instead of claiming success. Tested by stamping a
file at version 99 and asserting both the refusal and that the stamp is left
untouched.

lumbridge-settings resolves compiled default -> settings.toml -> environment.
The environment sits above the file deliberately: decision 0016 calls
LUMBRIDGE_CLAUDE_OAUTH=0 "one switch off", and a switch a config file can
silently re-enable is not a switch. A pinned value renders disabled and names
the variable, rather than accepting an edit that would do nothing.

Every field carries a WriteAuthority. Routing all writes through Configure is
the obvious design and would hand a layout-only agent the program every future
pane launches — the guarantee decision 0006 exists to make. Anything naming a
program, path or destination is Human-only, asserted by a test that reads the
path rather than trusting the author.

Four paths are permanently not settings, with the reason recorded beside each
and a test asserting their absence: the usage endpoint URL, the credentials
path, the client identity, and the shell program. A configuration file that can
redirect where an access token is sent is a credential exfiltration path with a
friendly name.

Environment access is a trait rather than std::env, because the workspace forbids
unsafe, set_var is unsafe in Rust 2024, and the layering rule has to be testable
without mutating the process running the test.

Verified live with LUMBRIDGE_CLAUDE_OAUTH=0: the account-endpoint row reads off,
greyed, "pinned by LUMBRIDGE_CLAUDE_OAUTH". The Advanced page names every file,
endpoint and child process Lumbridge touches and states that nothing is sent
anywhere else — as a fact, not as a toggle nobody can flip.

File loading, comment-preserving writes and editable controls are not in this
pass; 0022 records why that order is the honest one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 00:06:06 -07:00

4.1 KiB

0022: Settings are layered, and every field says who may write it

Status: accepted; the crate and the pane are live, file loading is not.

Everything Lumbridge could be configured by was an environment variable set inside scripts/open-metal-lumbridge.sh: invisible from inside the application, and unchangeable without editing the launcher.

Layers

Compiled default → settings.toml → environment.

The environment sits above the file, which is the reverse of the usual arrangement and is deliberate. Decision 0016 calls LUMBRIDGE_CLAUDE_OAUTH=0 "one switch off". A switch that a configuration file can silently re-enable is not a switch, so the file loses.

A value pinned by the environment renders disabled, naming the variable that pinned it. Not annotated — disabled. An interface that accepts an edit which will not take effect has lied about what it does.

Every value carries where it came from, for the same reason a usage number carries a provenance: a value you cannot trace is a value you cannot trust.

Write authority

Routing every write through the Configure capability is the obvious design and it is wrong. It would hand a layout-only agent a way to set the program that every future pane launches, which is precisely the guarantee decision 0006 exists to make.

So each field carries a WriteAuthority. Anything naming a program, a path, or a network destination is Human, and a non-human origin is refused rather than quietly downgraded. A test asserts the rule from the path itself, so a new setting whose name contains path or feed cannot ship as agent-writable.

What is not a setting, permanently

FORBIDDEN_PATHS names them, with the reason beside each, and a test asserts they never appear:

  • usage.oauth_endpoint — the URL an access token is sent to. A configuration file that can redirect it is a credential exfiltration path with a friendly name.
  • usage.credentials_path — the file the token is read from; the same attack from the other end.
  • usage.client_name — the identity Lumbridge presents. Decision 0016 refuses to send the harness's own User-Agent because it would make our traffic indistinguishable from the harness's in the provider's logs; a settings key would undo that.
  • terminal.shell_program — decision 0006 again.

Unknown keys are ignored, not rejected, and not silent

A file written by a newer build must still open in an older one, so the schema does not deny unknown fields. But a key that vanished without a word is a key the user thinks is in effect, so they are collected and reported on the Advanced page. A parse error is an error: the last good content is kept and a banner shown, because a typo must never silently reset a configuration to defaults.

Advanced states facts, not toggles

"What Lumbridge reads" lists every file, endpoint and child process by name, and ends with "Nothing is sent anywhere else. There is no telemetry to turn off." That is a fact. Rendering it as a switch nobody can flip would be theatre.

Paths

~/.config/lumbridge/settings.toml on Linux; on macOS under Application Support and explicitly not ~/Library/Preferences, which is CFPreferences territory where defaults and the preference daemon rewrite files in their own format — fatal for a file whose comments are its documentation. Behind a trait with a shared contract test, so the macOS half is at least checked on Linux.

Not in this pass

The file is not read yet: the pane resolves compiled defaults against the real environment, which is why the environment-pinned rows are already correct. Load, atomic 0600 write through toml_edit to preserve comments, and a directory watcher with echo suppression are the next step — a debounced write that bounces off its own watcher event loops forever, so the hash of the last written bytes has to be recorded and matched.

Editable controls are also pending. Every row shows its value, origin, authority and when it applies; none of them can yet be clicked. That is the honest order: the pane tells the truth about the configuration before it offers to change it.